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Abstract
The research presented in this thesis aims at understanding some of the principles by
which aggregate patterns in competitive markets emerge as a result of the interactions
between economic agents. Experiments are used in every step as a bridge between
theory and its target applications. Each of the three self-contained chapters focuses
on a different aspect of equilibrium or equilibration in a competitive framework.
The objective of the first chapter is to examine the validity of the Rothschild-
Stiglitz’ equilibrium in the context of a simple model of lending under adverse selection.
In experiments I develop a particular market structure and study to what extent
it generates the theoretical predictions. In the baseline part of the study where
equilibrium exists, the outcomes of the theory are strongly supported by the data.
The inconclusive findings from the controversial non-existence of equilibrium part of
the study lead to the idea that perhaps instead of judging models by whether their
outcome predictions are observed, a step back should be made and the basic principles
that are in place independent of the final outcome should be studied. Discovering
several such basic principles in the data is the objective of the second chapter of
this thesis. In the context of lending, the main finding is that lenders introduce
contracts that are sometimes very different from the contracts already offered in the
marketplace, thus rejecting the hypothesis of local dynamics.
In the third chapter experimental evidence that security prices do not respond to
pressure from their own excess demand, unlike the traditional Walrasian tatonnement
model predicts, is presented. Instead, prices respond to excess demand of all securities,
despite the absence of a direct link between markets. A model of price pressure that







1 Competition in Lending 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Benchmark Case: Identical Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Adverse Selection: Two Types of Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Parametrization of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 Conjectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.3 Certainty Equivalent Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.4 The Laboratory Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Summary of the Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 Baseline Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 Non-Existence Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.1 Baseline Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.2 Non-Existence Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
vii
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Bibliography 23
2 Dynamics in Markets with Adverse Selection 47
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2 Brief Literature Review and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Theory Overview and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4 Experimental Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5 Description of the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Bibliography 63
3 Modelling Price Pressure 70
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2 Description of the Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3 Modelling Excess Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4 Walrasian Price Adjustment: Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5 An Alternative Model of Price Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.6 The Data Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87




Economic agents often face situations in which they must interact without being
fully aware of their environment. They might lack information about other parties’
characteristics such as endowments or preferences, or be simply unable to enumerate
the other agents present in the economy. This is especially true when many agents
seeking gains from trade get together in an organized marketplace and engage in
exchange of assets or commodities. While general equilibrium theory is a suitable tool
for analyzing such situations, it does not tell a very realistic story for how equilibria
are achieved. Usually a Walrasian tatonnement or non-tatonnement argument is given
despite the fact that there is no Walrasian auctioneer present in the actual markets. If
the economy is complicated by asymmetric information frictions, then even the fabled
auctioneer cannot be resorted to in describing the equilibration process as there is
no general consensus of what equilibrium concept should be used in this setup in
the first place. The research presented in this thesis aims at understanding some of
the principles by which aggregate patterns in competitive markets emerge as a result
of the interactions between economic agents (whose behavior is not “orchestrated”
by anyone—be the Walrasian auctioneer or a benevolent social planner). Thus the
nature of this work is mainly descriptive. Experiments are used in every step as a
bridge between theory and its target applications. Each of the three self-contained
chapters focuses on a different aspect of equilibrium or equilibration in a competitive
framework.
The objective of the first chapter is to examine the validity of the Rothschild-
Stiglitz’ (henceforth RS) equilibrium in the context of a simple model of lending
under adverse selection. The original RS equilibrium is adapted to allow for multiple
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contracts to be offered by a single lender. It is well known that slight changes in
the degree of agents’ (in this case lenders) sophistication assumed for the analysis
of adverse selection environments can have significant effects on predicted outcomes.
This is what has been widely explored by numerous authors as a reaction to the
seminal RS paper and its claim that markets with adverse selection can have robust
regions of non-existence of equilibrium. When equilibrium as defined by RS exists,
however, almost all of the models’ outcome predictions coincide: from all possible
loan contracts only two are viable, and they separate the projects being financed by
quality (in the lending interpretation). In experiments I develop a particular market
structure and study to what extent it generates the theoretical predictions. In the
non-controversial case when the adapted RS equilibrium exists, the RS theory’s (and
therefore almost all other theories’) outcome prediction is confirmed. The contracts
traded are clearly separated in two clusters around the two equilibrium contracts.
The entrepreneurs with high-risk projects take bigger loans and bear higher credit
spreads than the low-risk-project entrepreneurs. However, when equilibrium in the
adapted RS sense does not exist, in two out of four sessions loan trading appears to
stabilize around the original RS equilibrium pair. In the other two sessions, however,
markets never settle down.
The finding that when most of the theories agree the outcome of the experiments
confirms the theoretical implications is very reassuring. At the same time, the results
from the second group of experiments clearly show that more conclusive empirical
evidence is needed before determining which of the abundance of theoretical models
is more relevant. Perhaps instead of judging models by whether their outcome
predictions are observed, a step back should be made and the basic principles that
are in place independent of what the final outcome of the model is should be studied.
Discovering such basic principles in the data is the objective of the second chapter of
this thesis.
The different notions of equilibrium all have their own logic and some may be
more persuasive theoretically than others, but it is ultimately the data that should
determine which is more relevant. The experiments in which equilibrium eventually
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obtains provide a unique testbed to discriminate between the key principles about
equilibration dynamics that have been proposed as alternatives to the ones outlined in
the RS’ paper. These are: (i) pooling contracts are expected to be taken disproportionately
by agents who have more to gain; (ii) insurers (lenders) only consider offering contracts
that are close to those already available in the marketplace. In the original RS
equilibrium, different types of agents take pooling contracts in the population proportion,
and insurers (or lenders) consider offering any contract, not only marginally improving
ones. The data from the experiments does not support either of the above hypothesis.
When a pooling contract is offered, it is taken by the two types of agents in their
proportion in the population independent of their gains from trade. Lenders also do
not take only local steps in the process of approaching equilibrium. The relevance of
those results expands beyond the scope of markets with adverse selection. Aggregate
patterns of equilibration paths can differ substantially depending on the assumption
of local vs. global adjustments that agents make when approaching equilibrium in
markets with symmetric information as well. With plenty of experimental data from
such markets the issue of the nature of adjustments should be further investigated.
In the third chapter experimental evidence that security prices do not respond to
pressure from their own excess demand, unlike the traditional Walrasian tatonnement
model predicts, is presented. Instead, prices respond to excess demand of all securities,
despite the absence of a direct link between markets. A model of price pressure
that explains these findings is proposed. In this model, agents set order prices that
reflect the marginal valuation of desired future holdings, called “aspiration levels.”
In the short run, as agents encounter difficulties executing their orders, they scale
back their aspiration levels. Marginal valuations, order prices, and hence, transaction
prices change correspondingly. The model makes a specific prediction about the
nature of cross-security effects: the covariance between a security’s transaction price
and another security’s excess demand will be proportional to the corresponding
payoff covariance. This additional prediction is fully borne out by the data. To
be consistent with one’s own principles, however, further investigation is needed in
order to discriminate between the above proposed individual behavior and the one
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outlined in Bossaerts (2002) as both models make observationally equivalent aggregate
predictions in the present experimental setup.
xii
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Beginning with the seminal papers of Ross (1977) and Leland-Pyle (1977), corporate
finance has asked about the choice of financial contracts (e.g., debt, equity) in environments
with asymmetric information. In particular, this literature asks whether the financial
contracts offered will separate firms into different risk categories. This paper uses an
experimental environment to study the financial contracts offered and chosen, and
the separation of firms, when lenders compete.
The experiments are built on a variation of the familiar Rothschild-Stiglitz (1977)
(henceforth RS) model of markets with adverse selection. Risk-averse entrepreneurs
need outside financing for projects of differential quality, known only to them. Risk-
neutral lenders provide financing contracts called loans.1 Lenders know the proportion
of the high-risk projects in the pool of projects but do not know the quality of the
individual projects. Loans are distinguished by the amount of the required investment
they cover, i.e., by their leverage. Lenders can compete on the terms (interest
payment) of any of the loans. We allow lenders to offer more than one contract,
so it is natural to think about equilibrium in menus of contracts in addition to the
RS notion of equilibrium in single contracts.
Two experimental environments are considered. In the first environment the RS
1The actors in the RS model are labeled “insurance companies” and “potential policyholders”
rather than “lenders” and “entrepreneurs” but the difference is only one of interpretation.
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equilibrium in single contracts exists, is constrained Pareto-optimal, and coincides
with the equilibrium in menus of contracts. In this setting we find strong support for
the theoretical predictions. In particular, the contracts offered separate the two types
of projects: the high-risk projects are financed with bigger loans but higher interest
payments than the low-risk projects. In the second environment the RS equilibrium in
single contracts exists but is not Pareto-optimal; the equilibrium in menus of contracts
does not exist. The experimental findings for this setup are mixed. In two out of four
sessions the RS equilibrium contracts are reached. In the other two, cross-subsidized
pairs of contracts are temporarily traded but markets never settle down.2
Rothschild-Stiglitz (1977) offers a notion of competitive equilibrium in markets
with adverse selection; an equilibrium is
a set of contracts such that, when customers choose contracts to maximize
expected utility, (i) no contract in the equilibrium set makes negative
expected profits; and (ii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set
that, if offered, will make a nonnegative profit.
RS restrict the lenders to offer single contracts. We allow them to offer menus of
contracts, and adapt the notion of competitive equilibrium; an equilibrium in the
adapted sense is
a set of contracts such that, when customers choose contracts to maximize
expected utility, (i) no contract in the equilibrium set makes negative
expected profits; and (ii’) there is no menu of contracts outside the equilibrium
set that, if offered, will make a total nonnegative expected profit.
An equilibrium according to the latter notion exists exactly when the RS equilibrium
exists (which it may not) and is Pareto-optimal, in which case the two coincide.3
In experiments we develop a particular market structure and study to what extent
it generates the theoretical predictions of the above equilibrium notion.
2A “cross-subsidized” pair of contracts is a pair in which one contract makes a positive expected
profit and the other makes at most an offsetting expected loss.
3Other notions of equilibrium have also been offered; see Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977), and
Riley (1979) among others. All these reduce to the RS equilibrium when it exists and is Pareto-
optimal.
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Two parameterizations of the adapted RS model are implemented in the experimental
markets. In the first environment, called the Baseline environment, a situation where
competitive equilibrium predicts an optimal provision of contracts is examined. In
the second environment, called the the Non-Existence environment, we change the
parameters in a way so that competition would drive out the optimal contracts,
theoretically that is, and we calibrate the results against the outcomes from the
benchmark experiments.
The purpose is twofold. On one hand we aim to discover whether markets attain
equilibrium in the non-controversial case where the latter (exists and) is Pareto-
optimal. On the other hand we question whether competition really stands in the
way of Pareto-optimality when the Pareto-optimal outcome cannot be supported in
equilibrium. One appealing alternative principle is that suboptimal contracts are
ultimately eliminated from the markets. The purpose of the second part of the study
is to discover whether such principle can actually provide a better description of the
market outcomes than competitive equilibrium does.
The use of experimental as opposed to field data prevents econometric complications
due to the confounding effects of estimating the parameters of the model and ascertaining
whether equilibrium occurs. In addition, the important ingredients of the model can
be isolated, while others are replaced with alternatives that facilitate evaluation of
the success of the experiment with respect to the basic questions that are being
asked. Because of the difficulty of measuring and controlling risk attitudes of human
subjects, for example, we choose to substitute leverage-dependent payoff schedules
for uncertainty in the final payoffs of the projects. That is, rather than assuming
that human subjects make decisions under uncertainty based on a specific expected-
utility function with common parameters, we give them payoffs that correspond to
the expected utility they would get from each of the contracts if they really had the
hypothesized risk attitudes.
In the Baseline environment we find that the traded contracts are clearly separated
in two clusters around the two equilibrium contracts. The cross-tabulation of the
types of projects within the clusters shows that the contracts indeed separate the two
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types of projects: the entrepreneurs owning the high-risk projects take bigger loans
and bear higher credit spreads than the entrepreneurs with the low-risk projects.
We do not observe cross-subsidization in any of the experimental sessions within
this environment. There is indication of small positive profits from contracts traded
with the entrepreneurs with low-risk projects that we attribute to the failure of high-
risk-project entrepreneurs to always pick their equilibrium contract when indifferent
between contracts. Thus, the results strongly support the Rothschild-Stiglitz type of
equilibrium in the benchmark treatment.
In the Non-Existence environment, cross-subsidization occurs in two out of four
sessions but is quickly destroyed as competition predicts. We observe instability and
lack of separation in these two sessions. In the other two, the RS equilibrium in
single contracts is eventually reached. The traded contracts separate the two types
of projects.
Thus, when the adapted RS equilibrium exists, i.e., when the original RS equilibrium
is Pareto-optimal, it predicts outcomes in experiments. When not, the evidence we
obtain in favor of any of the alternatives of the RS equilibrium notion is unconvincing.
The latter finding is important, because it means that the separating contracts studied
in the corporate finance literature following the seminal papers of Ross (1977) and
Leland-Pyle (1977) are questionable in a competitive framework where lenders offer
the contracts.
There are a few related experimental papers. The closest is Posey and Yavas
(1999). It studies experimental insurance markets where sellers can compete on the
prices of only two insurance contracts. The sellers move first and offer contracts; the
buyers move second and choose (in fact, the buyers’ decisions are made by computers).
Posey and Yavas find strong support that the two contracts are priced to generate zero
expected profits, thus supporting one element of the RS theory. In our experiments,
the contract space is substantially enriched. In addition, we do not computerize the
buyers’ side. We use a different market microstructure, namely the open book, which
has been shown to induce more competition. Another paper, Miller and Plott (1985),
studies adverse selection in experimental double-auction markets. Because of its great
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complexity, the underlying theoretical model does not give a unique prediction for
the market equilibrium, which perhaps explains why the results are mixed, with both
pooling and separation emerging. Whenever separation obtains, the level of the signal
is not at its optimal level. Our experimental markets are closer to the theory, and
therefore, simpler. Finally, Cadsby, Frank and Maksimovic (1990) study separation
in the context of a signaling model. We investigate the issue of separating within a
screening model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
the model and the theoretical results. Section 1.3 goes over the experimental design,
while Section 1.4 describes the laboratory markets. The results of the experiments
are in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
1.2 The Model
Consider an economy consisting of entrepreneurs and lenders.4 Each entrepreneur
has an exclusive access to an investment opportunity, or a project, requiring initial
investment of I. Both the initial investment, and the payoff from the project are
expressed in terms of the only consumption good available in the economy. If the
project succeeds (fails), its payoff is Xu (Xd), Xu > Xd ≥ 0.
Entrepreneurs can be of each of two possible types: high-risk and low-risk.5 Agents
of the high-risk type have probability ph of leading their firm to a low final payoff, Xd,
while this probability is equal to pl for the low-risk type, with ph > pl.
6 The proportion
of the high-risk entrepreneurs is equal to λ. Project failures happen independently
across entrepreneurs. All entrepreneurs are assumed to have the same Bernoulli utility
function U(x), strictly increasing and concave; U ′(x) > 0, U ′′(x) < 0. All of them
are expected utility maximizers, and all have the same initial endowment of wealth,
W . Entrepreneurs can choose whether or not to invest in the project, and they can
4The number of the entrepreneurs in the economy can be finite or infinite.
5Or, alternatively the projects are of differential quality: high-risk and low-risk. Each
entrepreneur is then associated with the quality of her project.
6Note that the term “risk” here is not used as a mean-preserving spread. The payoff distribution
of the low-risk project first order stochastically dominates the high-risk project’s payoff distribution.
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consume everything that they have not invested.
Definition 1.2.1. A generalized loan contract is a triple (L, Fu, Fd), where L is the
amount loaned (or the value of the loan contract), Fu is the face value of the loan if
the project succeeds, and Fd is the face value of the loan when the project fails.
Generalized loan contracts are offered by the lenders whose objective is to maximize
expected profits. The lenders face adverse selection as they cannot distinguish between
high and low-risk entrepreneurs. A contract (L, Fu, Fd) entitles the entrepreneur to
receive L from the lender before the project is undertaken, and obliges him to pay
back to the lender an amount equal to Fu or Fd if the outcome of the project is
Xu or Xd correspondingly. Let S ⊂ R3 denote the set of generalized loan contracts
available to the lenders. Lenders can offer any number of contracts from the set
S. The market for loans is competitive in the sense that there is free entry. Each
entrepreneur is allowed to take at most one loan contract from those offered implying
exclusivity of the loan contracts.
Definition 1.2.2. A contract (L, Fu, Fd) ∈ S is feasible if Fd ≤ Xd, and Fu ≤ Xu.
The parameters of the model, W, I, ph, pl, Xu, Xd, λ, the set S, and the function
U are all public information. Whether or not a project is undertaken is verifiable, as
is the outcome of the project.
A variation of the the notion of equilibrium introduced by Rothschild-Stiglitz
(1977) is employed. The original definition of equilibrium, which we call equilibrium
in single contracts, is stated below.
Definition 1.2.3. Equilibrium in single contracts is a set of feasible contracts such that
when entrepreneurs choose contracts to maximize expected utility, (i) no contract in
the equilibrium set makes negative expected profits; and (ii) there is no contract
outside the equilibrium set that, if offered, will make a nonnegative profit.
A natural notion of equilibrium when lenders are allowed to offer more than one
contract is the following variation of the RS’ equilibrium:
Definition 1.2.4. Equilibrium in menus of contracts is a set of feasible contracts such
that when entrepreneurs choose contracts to maximize expected utility, (i) no contract
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in the equilibrium set makes negative expected profits; and (ii’) there is no menu of
contracts outside the equilibrium set that, if offered, will make a total nonnegative
expected profit.7
It is easily seen that (ii’) implies (ii), therefore the following holds:
Proposition 1.2.5. The contracts that satisfy the definition of equilibrium in menus
of contracts are a subset of the contracts that satisfy the definition of equilibrium in
single contracts.
Definition 1.2.6. An allocation of contracts between the lenders and the entrepreneurs
is (constrained)8 Pareto-optimal if a benevolent central planner who possesses the
same information as the lenders cannot allocate feasible contracts between the lenders
and the entrepreneurs that would make everybody weakly better off and at least one
agent (a lender or an entrepreneur) strictly better off.
RS consider S = R3+ and demonstrate that the equilibrium in single contracts
might not be Pareto-optimal. Whenever this is the case, there are a continuum of
Pareto-improving pairs of contracts. In each such pair, the contract designed for the
high-risk agents loses money (in expectation) while the one for the low-risk agents
makes positive expected profit with an overall non-negative expected profit from the
two contracts. Such pairs will be called cross-subsidized pairs of contracts. From
all of those RS consider the one that leads to zero-profits for the lenders. From the
definitions of Pareto-optimality and equilibrium in menus of contracts, the following
proposition follows:
Proposition 1.2.7. The equilibrium in menus of contracts exists if and only if the
equilibrium in single contracts exists and is Pareto-optimal.
7The RS’ notion of equilibrium (and consequently its variation) is extremely parsimonious. The
lenders’ objective does not enter directly in the definition. It is implicitly assumed that lenders try
to maximize expected profits and that competition wipes out the expected profits to their minimum,
and this is the condition that enters in the definition. We are trying to understand how and which
contracts emerge in a competitive situation. Skipping the formal modelling of the first question, RS’
model directly addresses the second.
8“Constrained” is suppressed later in the text as this is the only notion of Pareto-optimality used
in this paper.
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Note that L ≤ I is not imposed, so that loans serve a consumption-smoothing
role in addition to financing part of the investment cost.9 After obtaining a contract
(L, Fu, Fd) and investing in the project, an entrepreneur consumes W+L−I independently
of the outcome of the project. In addition to that, the net output of the project,
Xu−Fu if it succeeds, or Xd−Fd if it fails, is also consumed. The total consumption in
the good state is thus Cu = W−I+Xu+Lh−F hu , while it is Cd = W−I+Xd+Lh−F hd
in the failure state. The following conditions must be satisfied by any contract in the
equilibrium set that is taken by an entrepreneur whose probability of failure is p.
W + L− I ≥ 0 (c1)
Fu ≤ Xu (c2)
Fd ≤ Xd (c3)
(1− p)U(Cu) + pU(Cd) ≥ U(W ) (IR)
Condition (c1) ensures that the loan amount combined with the initial wealth is
sufficient to cover the investment cost. (c2) and (c3) are the feasibility constraints.
The (IR) constraint imposes that the entrepreneur’s expected utility is weakly greater
with the loan contract than without.
In what follows we briefly characterize equilibria in the economy with S = R3+.10
1.2.1 Benchmark Case: Identical Entrepreneurs
If all agents’ probability of failure is p, the equilibrium contract maximizes the
entrepreneurs’ utility subject to a zero profit constraint for the lenders. Equivalently,
L = (1− p)Fu + pFd (c4)
9The analysis with the restriction L ≤ I is essentially the same, only the final allocations will be
Pareto-dominated by the allocations obtained without the constraint.
10For the purposes of the experiments we will have a finite set of possible contracts. However, first
solving the case with S = R3+, and then choosing the discrete grid for the actual contracts greatly
simplifies the equilibrium computations.
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Thus the equilibrium contract solves
Max
L,Fu,Fd
(1− p)U(Cu) + pU(Cd)
s.t. (c1), (c2), (c3), (c4), (IR) (1.1)
It is easily shown that (L, Fu, Fd) is such that:
0 ≤ Fd ≤ Xd
Fu = Xu −Xd + Fd
L = (1− p)Fu + pFd, L ≥ I −W
Without loss of generality, we take Fd = Xd.
11 This leads to the equilibrium contract
(L∗, F ∗u , F
∗
d ) = ((1−p)Xu +pXd, Xu, Xd). Note that entrepreneurs invest only in non-
negative net profit projects. The standard result that the lenders take all the risk
and the entrepreneurs enjoy the entire expected net profit of the projects is obtained
here as well.
1.2.2 Adverse Selection: Two Types of Entrepreneurs
As shown earlier, an equilibrium in menus of contracts exists if and only if the
equilibrium in single contracts exists and is Pareto-optimal. Therefore the equilibrium
in menus is found by deriving the equilibrium in single contracts first and then
checking the outcome for Pareto-optimality.12
We assume that if an equilibrium in single contracts exists, it is a separating
one.13 Let (Lh, F hu , F
h
d ) and (L
l, F lu, F
l
d) denote the contracts offered to the high
and the low-risk-type agents correspondingly (the consumption in the up and down
states is denoted Ciu, and C
i
d, i ∈ {h, l} correspondingly). In equilibrium a contract
11This is a standard loan contract with face value of the loan equal to Fu and value of the loan L.
12See Rothschild-Stiglitz (1977) for a more detailed treatment of Pareto-optimality of the
equilibrium in single contracts.
13Unlike in the original RS treatment here this is indeed an assumption, as shown later in the
text.
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(Li, F iu, F
i
d), i ∈ {h, l} must satisfy conditions (c1), (c2), (c3), and (IR) (which we
denote (c1i), (c2i), (c3i), and (IRi)) in addition to:
Li ≤ (1− pi)F iu + piF id (c4i)
(c4i) is the condition that the lenders do not lose money on the contract offered to
the i-risk entrepreneurs, i ∈ {h, l}.
Observe that if the separating equilibrium exists, the high-risk type agents must




h). Again, without loss of generality F hd = Xd, so that the equilibrium
contract for the high-risk types becomes the one described in the benchmark treatment
with p = ph. When (IRh) and (IRl) are temporarily dropped, and that both risk
classes undertake their projects in equilibrium is assumed, the incentive compatibility
condition (IC) that the equilibrium contracts should satisfy can be written as
U(Ch) ≥ (1− ph)U(C lu) + phU(C ld)
(IC) states that the high-risk entrepreneurs prefer the contract designed for them to
the contract designed for the low-risk entrepreneurs.
The (IC) condition is binding in equilibrium. Also, assume that (cl1) does not
bind (and therefore (cl4) does14). Denote the binding conditions with primes. Then





(1− pl)U(Ciu) + plU(C ld) (1.2)
s.t. (IC)′&(c4l)′
14This is the assumption guaranteeing that pooling contracts do not exist in this environment.
Consider the following example Xu = 100, Xd = 20, I = 50, W = 15, ph = 2/5, pl = 1/5, U(x) =
−e−bx, where b = 0.008. Assuming a separating solution and solving for it leads to F lu−F ld = 18.5401.
Therefore the largest possible Ll is equal to 34.8321, and therefore W + Ll < I. However there is
a pooling contract that provides the low-risk entrepreneurs with amount just enough to cover the
investment. The RS argument for non-existence of pooling equilibrium does not work in this case
because skimming the low-type agents requires offering a lower loan, which would not be enough to
cover the investment cost.
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Once derived, the solution should be checked against the IR constraints. Lastly, one
should check whether λ is such that the separating equilibrium in single contracts can
be sustained, and if so, whether it is Pareto-optimal. Only if all these conditions are
satisfied then the equilibrium in menus of contracts exists.
1.3 Experimental Design
1.3.1 Parametrization of the Model
The utility functions of the entrepreneurs are taken to be affine transformations of
U(x) = x − 1
2
bx2, where b = 0.008. The low-risk entrepreneurs have utility function
Ul(x) = 20U(x) − 522, while for the high-risk entrepreneurs it is Uh(x) = 10U(x) −
121.15 The initial wealth of the agents is W = 0. If successful, the project brings
Xu = 100, while in the case of failure the payoff from the project is Xd = 0.
The high-risk entrepreneurs’ probability of failure is ph = 7/9, while this probability
is pl = 5/9 for the low-risk agents. For simplicity, the cost of the investment, I, is
taken to be zero. Each lender is given the utility function UL(x) = 10x.
When S = R3, the lowest fraction of the high risk type agents, λ, for which the
equilibrium in single contracts can be sustained is λ = 0.47. When λ ≥ 0.47, the
equilibrium contract for the high-risk entrepreneurs is (Lh∗, F h∗u , F
h∗
d ) = (22.22, 100, 0).
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The equilibrium contract designed for the low-risk agents is (Ll∗, F l∗u , F
l∗
d ) = (10.22, 23, 0).
For the values of the parameter λ used in the experimental design, the equilibrium
in single contracts under the above parametrization is not (constrained) Pareto-
optimal. The set of Pareto-dominating contracts depends on the value of λ. For
example, if λ = 6/11 then the zero-profit optimal pair of contracts is (Ll, F lu, F
l
d) =
(14.66, 40.05, 0), and (Lh, F hu , F
h
d ) = (24.84, 100, 0).
Whenever the equilibrium in single contracts is not Pareto-optimal, the equilibrium
15We use linear transformations of this function in the experiments in order to calibrate the actual
payoffs of the participants so that they earn approximately the same (dollar) amount in equilibrium.
Of course none of the results are affected if agent’s utility functions are affinely transformed.
16The high-risk agents smooth their consumption completely and consume 22.22 units of the good
independent the outcome of the project.
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in menus of contracts does not exist. Therefore in the above parametrization the
equilibrium in menus of contracts does not exist if S = R3. In the Baseline environment,
however, the contract space is discretized in such a way, that the RS’ equilibrium-in-
single-contracts pair is preserved, but all pairs that Pareto-dominate it are removed.
This restores the existence of the equilibrium in menus of contracts with respect to
the newly chosen set of available contracts, S ′. Thus, in the Baseline environment, the
equilibrium in single contracts, the equilibrium in menus of contracts, and the Pareto-
optimal pairs all coincide. In the Non-existence environment, the contract space S ′ is
enriched to S ′′ as to include two pairs that Pareto-dominate the equilibrium-in-single-
contracts pair. Thus, in the second environment, which we call the Non-existence
environment, the equilibrium in single contracts is the pair of contracts (22.22, 100, 0),
and (10.22, 23, 0); there are two pairs of contracts that Pareto-dominate this equilibrium
pair; and, the equilibrium in menus of contracts does not exist.
In the experimental design both the loan and the repayment take integer values.
Thus, the equilibrium contracts become (Lh∗, F h∗u , F
h∗
d ) = (22, 100, 0), and (L
l∗, F l∗u , F
l∗
d ) =
(10, 23, 0). The discretization of the problem and the rounding of the payoffs create a





Because the repayment Fd is always equal to zero, a contract is fully determined by
the values of L and Fu, or equivalently by the values of Fu−L and Fu. For the purposes
of our experimental design, we define a contract by the pair (α, β) = (Fu, Fu − L).
We refer to the quantity Fu − L as a “credit spread.” Figure 1.1 shows the grid of
contracts used in the Baseline experiments in the (α, β) plane. Figure 1.2 is the grid
for the Non-existence environment.
1.3.2 Conjectures
The parametrization of the model described above is used to formulate a number of
conjectures, to be tested empirically later on.
(A) The entrepreneurs can be separated by their risk type based on the loan
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contracts they take. High-risk entrepreneurs take bigger loans and bear higher credit
spreads than the low-risk entrepreneurs.
(B) Lenders make zero expected profits on every contract they offer.
We expect (A) and (B) to be confirmed in the Baseline environment. For the
Non-existence environment, we formulate the following conjectures:
(C) The contracts traded stabilize around the equilibrium-in-single-contracts pair.
(D) The contracts traded stabilize around the Pareto-optimal pair, which involves
cross-subsidization.
1.3.3 Certainty Equivalent Payoffs
Because of the difficulty of measuring and controlling risk attitudes of human subjects,
we substitute leverage-dependent payoff schedules for uncertainty in the final payoffs
of the projects. That is, rather than assuming that human subjects make decisions
under uncertainty based on a specific expected-utility function with common parameters,
we give them payoffs that correspond to the expected utility they would get from each
of the contracts if they really had the hypothesized risk attitudes.
The expected utility functions of the two entrepreneur types as well as the lender
are tabulated as a functions of (α, β) = (Fu, Fu − L). Ui(α, β) = E(Ui(x)|(α, β)) =
(1 − pi)Ui(100 − β) + piUi(α − β) is the expected utility of an entrepreneur of type
i, i = h, l upon obtaining the contract (α, β). Similarly, a lender gets UL(α, β, i) =
E(UL(x)|(α, β), i) = (1− pi)UL(α)−UL(α− β) in expectation after loaning (α, β) to
a type i, i = h, l agent.
1.3.4 The Laboratory Markets
In the Baseline environment, the possible contracts are given by
α ∈ {8, 16, 20, 23, 26, 34, 44, 55, 65, 75, 85, 95, 100, 105, 110} = (αi)15i=1,




In the Non-existence environment we use
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α ∈ {16, 20, 23, 26, 34, 35.6, 40.05, 44, 55, 65, 75, 85, 95, 100, 105, 110} = (αi)16i=1,
β ∈ {7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 22.3, 23, 25.39, 29, 35, 41, 53, 56, 59, 62, 71, 74, 75.16, 75.95,
76.65, 78, 79, 81, 84, 87} = (βi)25i=1.
The experiments are conducted as market experiments. The contracts are called
“financial instruments,” or “securities,” and they can be bought and sold in the
experimental markets. There are fifteen financial instruments in the Baseline environment
defined by α1, ..., α15, and called “A,” “B,” “C,” ..., “O” in the actual experiments.
The market for the financial instrument “A” is called market A, for “B” it is market
B, and so on. Each financial instrument can be traded at twenty three possible
“prices”, corresponding to β1, ..., β23. and called 1, 2, ..., 23 in the experiments.
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The equilibrium contracts in this notation are D4 = (α4, β4) = (23, 13), and M18 =
(100, 78) or L16 = (95, 74). The contacts in the Non-existence environment are
defined in a similar fashion. The financial instruments are called “A,” “B,” ..., “P ,”
and the prices go from 1 to 25. The equilibrium in single contracts is represented by
C3, and N21 or M17. There are two pairs that Pareto-dominate the RS equilibrium
outcome. Those pairs are (G8, N18), and (F6, N19). The currency in which all
contracts are denominated is called francs. The earnings of each participant are
converted to dollars at a pre-announced rate in the end of each experiment.
Each experimental session consists of ten to fourteen identical trading periods
with length from two to five minutes. The entrepreneurs in the experiments are
called “buyers,” while the lenders are “sellers.” Each buyer can be of one of the
two possible types—Red or Blue, corresponding to the high-risk and the low-risk
entrepreneurs.18 Each seller is allowed to offer any number of financial instruments
and at any price. The buyers, on the other hand, can buy at most one financial
instrument per period. Moreover, buyers cannot send “buy orders” to the market,
they can only match existing “sell offers.”19
Each buyer is presented with a payoff table (see Figure 1.3 for the payoff table of
17(α1, β1) is represented by A1, (α2, β1) by B1, and so on.
18Whether a participant in an experiment is a buyer or a seller is determined randomly in the
beginning of the experiment. The type of a given buyer can change from period to period but the
proportion of Red buyers is constant throughout the periods.
19The instructions for the Baseline environment can be found in the Appendix.
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the Blue buyers, and Figure 1.4 for the payoff table of the Red Buyers) in which the
expected payoffs Ui(α, β), i ∈ {h, l} are tabulated. Similarly, each seller is presented
with a payoff table that indicates for each financial instrument and price the possible
payoff depending on what type of buyer buys the financial instrument at that price
(see Figure 2.1 for the payoff table of the sellers).20 That is, the function UL(α, β, i),
i ∈ {l, h} is tabulated and presented to the sellers. The total payoff for a seller in a
given period is equal to the sum of the payoffs from the individual transactions.
Every participant’s total earnings from an experimental session equal the cumulative
earnings from all periods.
1.4 Summary of the Sessions
1.4.1 Baseline Environment
The Baseline environment study consists of seven experimental sessions. Four of
the experimental sessions were conducted at the California Institute of Technology
(CIT). We call those sessions BCIT1, BCIT2, BCIT3, and BCIT4. Two sessions were
conducted at Sofia University (SU), Bulgaria. We call those BSU1, and BSU2. The
last session within the Baseline environment was at UCLA, and we call it BUSLA.
All subjects participating from Caltech were Caltech undergraduate students taking
introductory Economics class. A large majority of the participants at Sofia University
were students either in the Department of Mathematics and Informatics of SU, or in
the Department of Physics of SU. The rest were students from other departments of
SU or other universities in Sofia, Bulgaria. The participants at the UCLA site were
students enrolled for the 2002 Summer term at UCLA. The summary of the Baseline
sessions is presented in Table 1.1.
The sessions BCIT1, BCIT2, BSU1, and BSU2 were organized as open outcry
markets. The rest were organized as computerized markets. In the manually run
20Each cell of the payoff table of the sellers consists of four entries. The payoff from a transaction
with a Blue buyer is given in bold blue, while with Red is in bold red. In parenthesis, beneath the
sellers’ possible payoffs are the corresponding buyers’ payoffs.
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sessions, either on a screen (for BCIT1 and BCIT2), or on the blackboard (for BSU1,
and BSU2) was a table like the one in Figure 1.6. If a seller wanted to send a sell
order to the market, the seller had to raise her ID number, announce the market,
the price, as well as the number of units she wanted to sell at this market and price.
Buyers could only accept offers. In order to accept an offer, a buyer had to raise his ID
number, and announce the market and the price of the offer he wanted to accept. In
the manually conducted experiments the book was organized in chronological order.
When a buy order came, the contract that was sold first was the one that was offered
first. In the computerized experiments a seller was picked at random when a given
contract was offered by more than one seller.
The sending of sell and buy orders in the computerized experiments was done by
clicking on the cells of a table similar to the one used for the manual experiments.21
In Table 1.2 we present the exchange rates for the seven session as well as the average
payoffs for the sellers and the buyers.22
1.4.2 Non-Existence Environment
This part of the study differs from the previous one only in the discretization of the
contract space. Among the new contracts included in the grid of contracts are two
pairs that Pareto-dominate the equilibrium-in-single-contracts pair of contracts. We
ran four sessions within the Non-existence environment. All sessions were conducted
at UCLA, and we call them NUSLA1, NUSLA2, NUSLA3, and NUSLA4. All experiments
were computerized.23 All sessions had 23 participants: six sellers, and seventeen
buyers. In all sessions nine of the buyers were Red-type and eight were Blue-type
21Instructions and screens for the experiments we discuss here can be viewed at
http://eeps4.caltech.edu/market-020919 and use identification ID:1 and password:a to login as a
viewer. As a viewer you will not have a payoff but you will be able to see the trading screen as well
as all the forms.
22At the time the experiments were run, the exchange rate between US dollars and Bulgarian levs
was 2.11 levs per dollar. According to the estimate of the Bulgarian “Podkrepa” Labor Confederation,
at this time, people with minimum wage in Bulgaria disposed of USD 1.08 per day, while for those
with medium wage the amount was USD 3.80 per day.
23Instructions and screens for the experiments we discuss here can be viewed at
http://eeps4.caltech.edu/market-020917. Use identification:1 and password:a to login as a viewer.
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(i.e., for the Non-existence environment we had λ = 9/17 in all sessions). Following
one practice period, there were fourteen periods in each session. In Table 1.3 we
present the exchange rates as well as the average payoffs for the sellers and the buyers
in these four sessions.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Baseline Environment
This section includes the results from all Baseline sessions. To test conjecture (A),
we first test the null hypothesis the data comes from a bivariate normal distribution
versus the alternative that the data comes from a mixture of two bivariate normal
distributions, i.e.,
H0 : (α, β) ∼ N(µ, Σ0)
vs.
H1 : (α, β) ∼ (1− θ)N(µ1, Σ1) + θN(µ2, Σ2),
where µi = (µiα, µiβ), i = 1, 2.
Note: the mixture model maximum log likelihood estimates are based on the EM
algorithm, which is standard for estimating mixture models.
The null hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the alternative at the 95% confidence
level (with a p-value of less than 0.001). If the theoretical predictions of our model
hold, the estimate of the mixture parameter θ should not be significantly different
than the weighted average of the proportions of Red buyers in all Baseline sessions,
λ̄. The mixture parameter’s estimate is θ̂ = 0.5566. The 95% confidence interval for
the parameter θ is (0.5247, 0.5886), and λ̄ = 0.5581 falls in it.
The above clearly shows that the data is separated in two clusters. Moreover, the
data is split between the two clusters in the right proportions. It remains to show
that the clusters are homogeneous, i.e., one is consisting mainly of transactions with
Red buyers while the other of transactions with Blue buyers. Table 1.4 shows the
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cross-tabulation by buyers’ types as well as the estimators of the mean parameters of
the two clusters.
Figure 1.7 shows the three-dimensional stem plot of all trades in the Baseline
sessions along with the indifference curves of the entrepreneurs (passing through the
equilibrium loan contracts), and the zero profit lines for the lenders. The indifference
curves are solid lines, with the high-risk entrepreneurs’ curve crossing the low-risk
entrepreneurs’ from above. The dotted lines are the corresponding (expected) zero-
profit lines for the lenders. The bottom part of the figure shows the contracts traded
in the α-β plane without accounting for the frequency with which each contract was
traded. The graphs clearly show the separation by clusters. The high-risk contracts
were traded mostly on the “high-risk” zero-profit line. The low-risk contracts were
traded slightly below the “low-risk” zero-profit line, i.e., at a profit for the sellers. To
test our conjecture (B), we test the hypotheses (Hl0): µ1β − plµ1α = 0 vs. (Hl1):
µ1β−plµ1α 6= 0 , and (Hh0): µ2β−phµ2α = 0 vs. (Hh1): µ2β−phµ2α 6= 0. (Hl0) states
that the mean contract in Cluster 1 traded on zero profit for the lenders (assuming
homogeneity of the clusters). The second one, (Hh0) states that the mean contract in
Cluster 2 made zero-profits for the lenders. Using all periods in the Baseline sessions,
we reject (Hl0) at the 95% level (t-statistic of 28.3). We also reject (Hh0) at the 95%
level (t-statistic of -8.7).24
As it usually takes some time for the markets to equilibrate (if they ever do), we
perform the analysis from above on the data from the last three periods of all Baseline
experiments.25 Table 1.5 shows the cross tabulation by types of buyers as well as the
estimators of the means of the two clusters.
The separation of the buyers by types in the two clusters is evident from the
results in Table 1.5. From the 132 contracts in Cluster 2, 122 were among the two
24If instead of using the separation by cluster, we use the actual types of the entrepreneurs,
i.e., if we test whether the contracts with high-risk entrepreneurs and the contracts with low-risk
entrepreneurs yield zero profits each for the lenders, we obtain similar results (the corresponding
t-statistics are 19.86 and -9.8).
25For the last three periods, the 95% confidence interval for the parameter θ is (0.4565, 0.5788),
and λ̄ falls in it.
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equilibrium contracts designed for the red buyers (84 were M18 and 38 were L16).
As the above shows, the contracts designed for the Red buyers were essentially the
two equilibrium contracts. As for the Blue buyers, the sellers offered contracts that
were slightly more “expensive” than the equilibrium contract. The mean low-risk
contract traded was (µ1α, µ1β) = (30, 20), providing consumption of 10 and 80 in the
case of failure and success of the project. The equilibrium consumptions are 10 and
87 correspondingly. When we test the hypotheses (Hl0) vs. (Hl1), and (Hh0) vs.
(Hh1), we still reject (Hl0) in favor of (Hl1). However, (Hh0) cannot be rejected
at the 95% confidence level. Thus, the lenders make zero profit on the contracts
designed for the high-risk entrepreneurs but they make profits on the ones designed
for the low-risk entrepreneurs. We attribute this to the fact that in equilibrium the
high-risk-type entrepreneurs are indifferent between the contracts designed for them
and the contract designed for the low-risk agents. If sellers have any doubts that the
high-risk entrepreneurs are going to choose the “right” contract, they are going to
offer to the low-risk agents a contract at slightly worse terms as to insure that the
high-risk agents do not choose it. The equilibrium contract for the low-risk agents
was traded 17 times in the last three periods. The contract that was traded most
often was F7=(34, 23). Note that it provides payoff of 79 francs for the Red buyers
as opposed to the 80 francs that they get from their equilibrium contracts. Figure 1.8
shows the three-dimensional stem plot of the trades from the last three periods.
It is interesting to note that although the average payment in Bulgaria was at
least ten times higher in real terms than the average payment in the US, there were
no significant differences between the structures of the clusters for the two data sets.
Overall, the results from the Baseline environment provide strong support for our
conjecture (A). They also support our conjecture (B) if we account for the positive
probability that the high-risk entrepreneurs might have of choosing the contract
designed for the low-risk entrepreneurs when indifferent between the two contracts.
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1.5.2 Non-Existence Environment
Here, as in the Baseline environment, we test the null hypothesis that the data comes
from a bivariate distribution versus the alternative that the data comes from a mixture
of two bivariate normal distributions. The former is rejected at the 95% confidence
level (again with a p-value less than 0.001). The proportion of the Red-type buyers
in this environment was λ = 9/17 in all sessions. If there is separation by risk types
we should expect the data to be split between the two clusters in ratio of (1− λ) : λ,
or θ should not be significantly different from 9/17. The estimate of the mixture
parameter is θ̂ = 0.35. The 95% confidence interval for θ is (0.3187, 0.3812) and
λ = 9/17 is well beyond this interval. Thus, at this stage, the econometrician who
only knows the proportion of the high-risk entrepreneurs and the contracts that were
traded in the market will be able to reject the prediction that the trades can be used
to separate the entrepreneurs by their risk types. The cross-tabulation of types within
the two clusters is shown in Table 1.6.
Although the separation of the data in two clusters is evident, unlike in the
Baseline environment, the two clusters here are not homogeneous (as expected after
inspecting the ratio of the trades in the two clusters).
We perform the same cross-tabulation for the last three periods of all Non-
existence environment experiments as we did for the Baseline experiments. The
results are in Table 1.7, and they still do not show separation in types between
the two clusters. Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 show the three-dimensional stem plots
of the trades from all periods and from the last three periods correspondingly.
In two of the four experiments under the Non-existence environment, the contracts
traded converged to the original equilibrium contracts. In the other two sessions,
however, we temporarily observed trading of cross-subsidized pairs of contracts. In
one of them the pair was (F8,I11), while in the other it was (E6, O23). In both
sessions this happened very close to the end of the experimental session as reflected
in the analysis of the last three periods only.
Thus, in the Non-existence sessions we cannot support conjecture (A). Two of the
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experiments support (A), while the other two clearly reject it. The overall conclusion
is that the entrepreneurs cannot be separated by their risk types based on the loan
contracts they take (we do not test conjecture (B) as we would be interested in it
only if (A) held). Conjecture (C) received mixed support while conjecture (D) can be
clearly rejected as in the two sessions when we observed cross-subsidization, it was
very quickly destroyed.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper examines a simple model of adverse selection in the context of competitive
provision of loans. The notion of equilibrium that is employed is an extension of
the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium to allow for multiple contracts to be offered by
a single lender (we refer to the original and the adapted notions as equilibrium in
single contracts and equilibrium in menus of contracts correspondingly). Experiments
are used to test the validity of its predictions. In equilibrium, the model makes the
strong prediction that from all possible loan contracts, only two are viable. Moreover,
competition does not necessarily push the loans and repayments to their optimal
levels. When it does not coincide with the equilibrium in single contracts, the Pareto-
optimal pair involves cross-subsidization between contracts.
As a first approach the model is tested with a benchmark scenario in which the
Pareto-optimal and the equilibrium contracts coincide. We find that the traded
contracts are clearly separated in two clusters around the two equilibrium contracts.
The cross tabulation of types within clusters shows that the contracts indeed separate
the two types of entrepreneurs: the high-risk entrepreneurs take bigger loans and
bear higher credit spreads than the low-risk entrepreneurs. Cross-subsidization is
not observed in any of the experimental sessions within this environment. Thus, the
results strongly support Rothschild-Stiglitz in the benchmark case.
Next, the model is tested in the case where the equilibrium in single contracts
pair is not Pareto-optimal. Temporary cross-subsidization occurs in two out of four
sessions. In the other two sessions the equilibrium in single contracts is eventually
22
reached. Thus, the results for this environment are mixed, showing that further
theoretical and experimental investigation is needed.
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Tables, Figures, and Instructions for the Experiments
Table 1.1: Summary of the Sessions
Exp. Date #Sellers #Red #Blue λa #Periods Computerized
1 BCIT1 5/25/01 4 5 4 5/9 10 no
2 BCIT2 6/25/01 4 5 4 5/9 10 no
3 BCIT3 6/3/02 6 8 7 8/15 11 yes
4 BCIT4 7/18/02 5 9 5 9/14 12 yes
5 BSU1 8/17/01 6 6 5 6/11 10 no
6 BSU2 8/18/01 6 6 5 6/11 10 no
7 BUCLA 9/19/02 6 9 8 9/17 14 yes
athe average proportion of Red buyers in all Baseline experiments
(weighted by the number of buyers in each session) was λ̄ = 0.5581
25
Table 1.2: Summary of the Payoffs in the Baseline Environment
Exp. Exchange Exchange Exchange Average Average
Rate Rate Rate Payoff Payoff
Seller Red Blue Sellers Buyers
1 BCIT1 $0.05 $0.03 $0.03 $15 $18
2 BCIT2 $0.05 $0.02 $0.02 $15 $19
3 BCIT3 $0.10 $0.03 $0.03 $34 $27
4 BCIT4 $0.10 $0.03 $0.05 $46 $32
5 BSU1 Lv0.10 Lv0.04 Lv0.04 Lv34 Lv31
6 BSU2 Lv0.09 Lv0.03 Lv0.03 Lv34 Lv26
7 BUCLA $0.04 $0.02 $0.03 $29 $22
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Table 1.3: Summary of the Payoffs in the Non-existence Environment
Exp. Exchange Exchange Exchange Average Average
Rate Rate Rate Payoff Payoff
Seller Red Blue Sellers Buyers
NUCLA1 9/5/02 $0.06 $0.02 $0.025 $49 $28 $21
NUCLA2 9/9/02 $0.04 $0.02 $0.03 $35 $28 $26
NUCLA3 9/11/02 $0.04 $0.02 $0.03 $15 $29 $34
NUCLA4 9/17/02 $0.04 $0.02 $0.03 $47 $27 $13
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Table 1.4: Baseline environment, all periods: Distribution of types by cluster
blue red µ̂iα µ̂iβ
Cluster 1 360 60 29 20
Cluster 2 50 475 94 71
28
Table 1.5: Baseline environment, last three periods: Distribution of types by cluster
blue red µ̂iα µ̂iβ
Cluster 1 107 16 30 20
Cluster 2 4 128 99 76
29
Table 1.6: Non-existence environment, all periods: Distribution of types by cluster
blue red µ̂iα µ̂iβ
Cluster 1 417 183 34 24
Cluster 2 9 314 95 73
30
Table 1.7: Non-existence environment, last three periods: Distribution of types by
cluster
blue red µ̂iα µ̂iβ
Cluster 1 95 43 33 23
Cluster 2 0 64 97 76
31
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Figure 1.3: Baseline: The Payoff Table for the Blue Buyers
blue A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
1 47 131 170 199 227 297 377 455 516 568 612 647 661 672 682
2 8 94 134 164 192 265 347 428 492 547 593 631 646 659 670
3 -32 55 97 127 156 231 316 400 467 524 573 613 630 644 657
4 -74 15 58 89 119 196 284 370 440 500 552 594 612 628 642
5 -89 2 45 76 106 184 273 360 431 492 544 588 606 623 637
6 -133 -40 4 36 67 147 238 329 402 466 521 567 587 604 620
7 -225 -128 -82 -48 -15 68 165 262 340 409 470 521 544 564 582
8 -323 -222 -174 -138 -104 -16 87 189 272 347 413 470 495 518 538
9 -427 -322 -271 -234 -198 -106 2 110 199 279 350 412 440 466 489
10 -536 -427 -374 -336 -298 -201 -88 26 120 205 282 349 380 408 434
11 -773 -655 -598 -556 -515 -410 -286 -161 -56 40 127 206 241 275 306
12 -835 -715 -657 -615 -573 -466 -339 -211 -103 -5 85 166 203 238 271
13 -900 -777 -718 -675 -632 -523 -394 -262 -152 -51 42 125 164 200 234
14 -1032 -906 -844 -800 -755 -642 -507 -370 -254 -148 -50 39 80 119 156
15 -1171 -1040 -976 -930 -884 -766 -627 -483 -362 -250 -147 -53 -9 32 72
16 -1242 -1109 -1045 -997 -951 -830 -688 -542 -419 -304 -198 -101 -56 -13 27
17 -1315 -1180 -1114 -1066 -1019 -896 -751 -602 -476 -359 -250 -151 -104 -60 -18
18 -1339 -1203 -1138 -1089 -1042 -919 -773 -623 -496 -377 -268 -168 -121 -76 -34
19 -1364 -1227 -1161 -1113 -1065 -941 -794 -643 -515 -396 -286 -185 -137 -92 -49
20 -1414 -1276 -1209 -1160 -1112 -986 -838 -685 -555 -434 -322 -219 -171 -125 -81
21 -1490 -1350 -1282 -1232 -1183 -1056 -904 -748 -616 -492 -378 -272 -222 -175 -130
22 -1568 -1425 -1356 -1306 -1256 -1126 -972 -814 -678 -552 -435 -326 -276 -227 -180
23 -1727 -1581 -1509 -1457 -1405 -1272 -1113 -948 -807 -676 -553 -439 -386 -335 -285
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Figure 1.4: Baseline: The Payoff Table for the Red Buyers
red A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
1 41 99 127 147 166 216 272 326 369 406 436 461 470 479 485
2 17 76 105 125 145 196 254 310 355 394 426 452 463 472 480
3 -9 53 82 103 123 176 235 294 341 381 415 443 455 465 474
4 -35 28 58 80 101 155 216 277 325 368 404 434 446 457 467
5 -43 20 50 72 93 147 210 271 320 363 400 430 443 455 464
6 -70 -6 25 48 70 125 190 253 304 349 387 420 433 446 456
7 -126 -59 -26 -3 20 79 147 214 269 318 360 396 412 426 439
8 -185 -114 -81 -56 -32 30 102 173 232 284 330 370 387 403 418
9 -247 -173 -138 -112 -87 -22 53 129 191 247 297 341 360 378 394
10 -311 -235 -198 -171 -144 -77 2 82 148 208 261 308 330 350 368
11 -449 -367 -327 -298 -269 -195 -109 -21 53 120 181 236 261 284 306
12 -485 -401 -361 -331 -302 -227 -138 -48 27 96 159 216 242 266 289
13 -522 -437 -395 -365 -335 -259 -168 -76 1 72 136 195 222 247 271
14 -599 -510 -467 -436 -405 -325 -231 -135 -54 21 89 151 180 207 233
15 -678 -586 -542 -509 -477 -394 -297 -196 -112 -33 39 105 135 164 192
16 -718 -625 -580 -547 -514 -430 -331 -228 -142 -61 13 80 112 142 170
17 -759 -665 -619 -585 -552 -467 -365 -261 -172 -90 -14 55 88 119 148
18 -773 -678 -632 -598 -565 -479 -377 -272 -183 -100 -23 47 80 111 141
19 -787 -692 -645 -611 -578 -491 -389 -283 -193 -110 -33 38 71 103 133
20 -816 -719 -672 -638 -604 -516 -412 -305 -214 -130 -51 21 55 87 117
21 -859 -760 -713 -678 -643 -554 -449 -339 -247 -160 -80 -6 29 62 93
22 -902 -803 -754 -719 -684 -593 -486 -374 -280 -191 -109 -33 2 36 69
23 -992 -889 -839 -803 -767 -673 -562 -446 -348 -256 -170 -90 -53 -17 17
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I.MARKET SETUP AND HOW TO MAKE MONEY
There are fifteen markets in this experiment. All fifteen markets involve securities
referred to as A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, and O.
The markets are going to be conducted in 10 to 15 periods. Periods will last 2-5
minutes each. You will be told before each period how long this period will be. We
will have one practice period before starting the actual ones. The payoff from the
practice period WILL NOT be added to your total payoff for the experiment. In each
period all fifteen markets are operating. The currency that is used in all markets is
called “francs”.
Your actions in a given period influence your payoff for that period ONLY. After
a period is finished you realize your payoff and a new period is initiated. Your total
earnings in the end of the experiment are the sum of your earnings across periods.
You can check your earnings at any time by clicking on the link HISTORY on the
trading screen.
The participants in the market are divided into two groups: sellers and buyers.
Whether you are going to be a seller or a buyer is going to be determined in the
beginning of the experiment and it WILL NOT change until the end of it. You can
find out whether you are a buyer or a seller by clicking on the “Participate in the
Sale” link. The information is in the upper left corner of the screen. The description
of the role of each participant in the market follows (we are going to refer to any
buyer as “he”, and to any seller as “she”):
-BUYERS: There are two types of buyers referred to as RED type and BLUE
type. In each period there are 9 RED buyers and 8 BLUE buyers, and these numbers
do not change across periods. Every buyer will be able to see his type on the
announcement board in the bottom of the screen. Please, DO NOT hit the reload
button at any time otherwise you will lose important information on the message
board.
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Buyers can only BUY securities. Each buyer is allowed to buy AT MOST ONE
security per period. (Note: it is not one security from each market—it is ONE security
overall!)
A payoff table determines the payoff. There are two different payoff tables, one
for the RED type buyers, and one for the BLUE type. You can see links to them
on the top of the screen when you click on the “Participate in the Sale” link. You
are also given hard copies of those tables. The payoff of each buyer depends on the
security bought AND on the price paid, and it is possible to have negative payoffs. If
by the end of a period a buyer has not obtained a security he automatically receives
a default payoff equal to 12 francs independently of the type. The total payoff from
the experiment for a given buyer is the sum of the payoffs from all periods during the
experiment.
A payoff table determines the payoff. There are two different payoff tables, one
for the RED type buyers, and one for the BLUE type. You can see links to them
on the top of the screen when you open the “Participate in the Sale” page. You are
also given hard copies of those tables. Each buyer is given both tables. Tables have
columns A, B, C, ... , O, denoting the names of the securities, and rows 1, 2, 3, ... ,
23, denoting the possible prices of those securities. If a buyer is RED type for a given
period the RED-type payoff table is to be used in that period. Similarly if you are
a BLUE type buyer, the BLUE-type payoff table is to be used in this period. The
payoff of each buyer depends on the security bought (column) AND on the price paid
(row), and it is possible to have negative payoffs. If by the end of a period a buyer has
not obtained a security he automatically receives a default payoff equal to 12 francs
independently of the type. The total payoff from the experiment for a given buyer is
the sum of the payoffs from all periods during the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, each franc will be converted to dollars. The
conversion rate is going to be announced privately to each buyer in the beginning
of the experiment. You will be able to find it on the message board in the bottom of
your screen. Below are parts of the tables presented to the buyers. [Tables Here]
For example, if you are a RED type of buyer and you choose to buy security C at
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price 5, your payoff for the period is going to be 50 francs. If you are a BLUE type of
buyer and you choose to buy C at price 5, your payoff is going to be 45 francs. As can
be seen from the tables, you can have negative payoff if you trade certain securities
at certain prices depending on your type.
-SELLERS: Sellers can offer securities to the buyers. Sellers are allowed to offer
and sell as many securities as they want. The sellers only know that each period there
are 9 RED and 8 BLUE types of buyers in the market. They do not know which of
the buyers are RED and which are BLUE.
If a seller does not participate in any transaction during a given period her payoff
for that period is 0 francs. However, a seller can increase or possibly decrease her
payoff by participating in a transaction.
The payoff from each transaction is determined from a payoff table. The payoff
depends on which security was sold, at what price, as well as on the TYPE of the
buyer to whom it was sold. At the time the seller makes her offer(s), she does not
know what type of buyer(s) will accept her offer(s).
In addition to the payoff from the table, there are 15 francs commission that
a seller gets from her FIRST contract sold, i.e., if you are a seller, and you sell 2
contracts with payoffs of 10 and 20 francs, 15 francs are added to the first one and
thus your total payoff becomes 45 (10+15+10) francs. Below is a part of the table
presented to the sellers: [Table Here]
The columns of the table A, B, C, ..., O denote the names of the securities, while
the rows 1, 2 ,3 ..., 23 denote the possible prices for those securities. Each cell of
the sellers’ payoff table consists of four entries. The payoff from transactions with
buyers of type BLUE is in bold BLUE. The payoff from transactions with buyers of
type RED is in bold RED. The payoffs of the buyers are given in parenthesis below
the corresponding seller’s payoff (in red for the RED buyers and blue for the BLUE
buyers).
Thus, if you are a seller and you offer, say, 1 unit of C at price 5, your payoff
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would depend on what type of buyer (if any) is going to buy this unit. If it is bought
by a RED buyer, your payoff from the transaction is -16 francs. The buyer’s payoff
is 50 (given in red in parenthesis). If a BLUE type of buyer buys your unit, your
payoff from the transaction is 29 francs. The blue buyer’s payoff is 45 francs. You
will not know the types of the buyers who participated in transactions with you until
the end of the period. Only after the end of the period, the types of the buyers will
be revealed and payoffs will be realized.
The total payoff (in francs) from the experiment for a given seller is the sum of
the payoffs from all periods during the experiment.
At the end of the experiment your total payoff will be converted to dollars at
an exchange rate that is going to be privately announced in the beginning of the
experiment. You will be able to find it on the message board in the bottom of your
screen.
IMPORTANT!!! Anybody (buyer or seller) who has negative total earnings for
more than two periods in a row will be excluded from further trading and will receive
nothing at the end of the experiment.
II. GLOSSARY OF IMPORTANT MARKET ELEMENTS
OFFERS:
Buyers and sellers, open the “Participate in the Sale” web page.
SELLERS:
Each cell on the trading screen has four entries: a/b c/d (all equal to zero in the
beginning of each period).
“a” is the number of units you sold at this market and price
“b” is the number of units sold by all sellers in this market and price
“c” is number of units currently offered by you in this market and price
“d” is the total number of units currently offered by all sellers in this market at that
price.
If you are a seller and you submit a SELL OFFER for a given security at a given
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price, this means that you are willing to sell the security to anyone at that price. If
no one accepts the offer (how offers are accepted is explained later in the text) it goes
unfilled. Your unfilled offer remain on the trading screen until it is cancelled by you,
is taken by a buyer, or the period is over.
If you are a seller, you may place sell offers for any number of units. The computer
will automatically fill orders if possible. If you want to place an order, you have to
click (in order to highlight it) on the cell indicating the market and the price you
want to submit order at, and then click on the “submit offer” button. Each click on
the “submit offer” button adds one more unit to the ones that are already offered at
the market and the price indicated by the highlighted cell.
If you want to cancel a still unfilled offer, you have to click on the cell where you
placed the offer and then click on the “Cancel Offer” button. Each click cancels one
of your outstanding offers.
BUYERS:
Each cell on the trading screen consists of two numbers a/b (both equal to zero in
the beginning of each period). “a” is the number of units bought by all buyers in this
market and price, while “b” is the number of units currently offered in this market
and price.
If you are a buyer, you will only be allowed to submit orders at those markets
and prices for which there are already offers from the sellers (i.e., you can click on
cells with posted offers only). If you attempt to submit a buy order for which there is
no counter sell order, your order will be automatically cancelled and no one will see
that you placed such an order. You are allowed to accept at most one buy order per
period. When you decide which of the offers to accept, you have to click on that offer
to highlight it and then hit the ”submit order” button. When the order is processed
successfully, the market and the price cell is highlighted in red. You will not be able
to cancel a once submitted order.
If there is more than one seller who offered a security at a given price, whenever
a buy offer comes, one of the sellers is going to be chosen randomly and her security
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will be the one sold to the buyer. NOTICE: orders are not executed chronologically.
A seller is chosen randomly each time there is more that one seller offering a given
security at a given price. Thus, submitting many orders does not improve your
chances of being chosen as long as you have at least one outstanding order.
Are there any questions?
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Chapter 2
Dynamics in Markets with Adverse
Selection
2.1 Introduction
This paper uses experiments to explore the dynamics of contract offers and acceptances
in competitive markets with asymmetric information. The experiments are designed
around the prototype of such markets, namely, Rothschild and Stiglitz’ [1977] (RS)
insurance markets. RS originally proposed a plausible notion of competitive equilibrium,
which however opened up the possibility of nonexistence of equilibrium and, even
if it exists, sub-optimality. Subsequent theoretical work1 advanced other notions
of equilibrium, based on different principles of equilibration, and restored generic
equilibrium existence, if not optimality. It is an open question, however, what
principles are at work in actual market dynamics. This is ultimately an empirical
question, which this paper attempts to address. The different notions of equilibrium
all have their own logic and some may be more persuasive theoretically than others,
but it is ultimately the data that should determine which is more relevant.
In cases where the RS equilibrium exist, Asparouhova [2003] demonstrated that
the RS insurance markets move towards equilibrium contract choices. The experiments
in Asparouhova [2003] provide a unique testbed to discriminate between the key
1Only a short list of which is comprised by the papers of Wilson [1977], Miyazaki [1977],
Spence [1978], Riley [1979], and the more recent ones by Dubey and Geanakoplos [2002] and
A.B. Ania at al. [2002].
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principles about equilibration dynamics that have been proposed in the literature to
address the problem of equilibrium non-existence. These are: (i)insurers only consider
offering contracts that are close to those already available in the marketplace;2 (ii)
pooling contracts are expected to be taken disproportionately by agents who have
more to gain. In the original RS equilibrium, insurers expect different insuree types
to take pooling contracts in the population proportion, and they consider offering any
contract, not only “local” ones
It would be inappropriate to study these principles in a situation of nonexistence of
RS equilibrium: while competing notions of equilibrium do make precise predictions
about outcomes in such situations, it is not clear what should happen if the principles
behind the RS equilibrium are correct. Observing that none of the competing equilibria
come about, it would be presumptuous to conclude that therefore the RS principles are
the correct ones. In cases where the RS equilibrium does exist (as in the experiments
of Asparouhova [2003]), the eventual outcomes are the same under all notions of
equilibrium; only the paths towards equilibrium differ substantially. Since equilibrium
has been demonstrated to eventually obtain, these experiments provide a non-controversial
setting in which to study dynamics of contract offerings.
The experimental setup can be briefly described as follows. A group of subjects3
can each offer (through an open-book system) contracts that correspond to the RS
insurance contracts. Subjects from another group can each accept any one from those
contracts offered in the marketplace. Each participant from this second group has
private information about his/her type. The proportion of the two possible types in
the population, however, is public information. Each experimental session consists
of ten to fifteen periods that are replications of the same situation. Periods are
independent. In each period the market opens, and after a pre-announced length
of time elapses, it closes. Offers and corresponding acceptances can be submitted
at any time during open market. A participant’s final earnings are the cumulative
2RS themselves advance the notion of local equilibrium as “a set of contracts such that there do
not exist any contracts in the vicinity of the equilibrium contracts that will be chosen and make a
positive profit.”
3The subjects were undergraduate and graduate students from Caltech, UCLA, and Sofia
University in Bulgaria.
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earnings from all periods. Subjects earned on average $35, with a minimum of $0,4
and a maximum of $90 per experimental session lasting approximately two hours.
The parameters in the experimental design are chosen so that the RS equilibrium
exists. This paper presents the results from six such experiments.
In all experimental sessions, contract choices move towards the RS equilibrium
pair of contracts. The process is not instantaneous, it takes time for the markets to
discover equilibrium. Throughout this dynamic process, however, only about 10% of
the contract recipients accept dominated offers: from the set of available offers, they
choose ones that do not maximize their monetary payoffs. Undominated acceptances
are necessary for testing the aforementioned principles of equilibration.
The conjecture that pooling contracts would be taken disproportionately by agents
who have more to gain is not supported in the data analysis. Whenever pooling
contracts are offered, they are taken by any of the two types agents in their proportion
in the population independent of the magnitude of the marginal gains from trade.
Also, when contract issuers compete in providing contracts, they do not always take
local steps as suggested by several models (see next section). The hypothesis that they
do so is strongly rejected by the data. Thus, this study suggest that the principles
outlined in the seminal RS paper are borne out in the data. Different insuree types
do take pooling contracts in their population proportions, and insurers do consider
offering contracts globally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides brief
literature review along with a few motivational remarks. Section 2.3 goes through
the theoretical overview. Section 2.4 explains the experimental setup, while section
2.5 describes the data. The results of the experiments are in section 2.6. Section 2.7
concludes.
4A bankruptcy rule is imposed in all experiments. If a participant’s cumulative earnings remain
negative for two periods in a row, he or she is excluded from further trading. Those with $0 earnings
are the bankrupted participants.
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2.2 Brief Literature Review and Motivation
In general, to cope with the non-existence problem of RS equilibrium, other notions of
equilibrium have been proposed; among them are the ones presented in Wilson [1977],
Miyazaki [1977], Spence [1978], and Riley [1979]. Each adds a degree of sophistication
on the beliefs that contract issuers hold: in Wilson’s [1977] model it is the anticipation
of immediate withdrawal of all unprofitable offers from the market that keeps insurance
companies from offering equilibrium-destroying contracts. Miyazaki [1977] and Spence [1978]
employ a similar anticipation concept that helps sustain equilibrium when multiple
contracts can be offered. Riley’s [1979] contract providers anticipate further entries
in the market when they decide to offer a new contract. This anticipatory behavior
supports the existence of equilibrium here as well. Interestingly, the above modifications
of the RS equilibrium concept can be paralleled to the coalition-proofness “modification”
used as a solution concept when the core of an economy is empty.
Dubey and Geanakoplos [2002] (DG) study markets with adverse selection characterized
by generic existence of equilibrium. DG work in a general equilibrium framework
where companies can offer contracts at market prices only. Equilibrium is supported
by the self-sustaining beliefs of the agents in the economy. DG justify their using this
particular notion of equilibrium by:
Rothschild and Stiglitz might have argued that instead of thinking of the
pools as strategic dummies, we could imagine that they were each run by
some entrepreneur. ... We have in mind a competitive world with many
small agents. If the little entrepreneur’s gambit is to be successful, he must
lure new reliable5 households at κ∗, who were unwilling to contribute at
κJ . But it is the unreliable, already willing to contribute at κJ , who will
be even more eager to contribute at κ∗, and likely to get to him first. If
so, his meagre wealth will certainly not be enough to stand guarantee for
his exorbitant offer of κ∗, and he will suffer a disaster.
DG bring forward questions that may turn crucial for understanding the workings
5DG have reliable and unreliable households instead of high-risk and low-risk types of agents.
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of markets with asymmetric information. When a contract is beneficial to several
recipients, is it the case that the recipients with the highest gains from trade react
among the first and take those contracts. The latter can be a problem, as pointed
out by DG, if contract providers are wealth constrained and the first acceptances
incur losses that exceed their wealth. Alternatively, imagine that pooling contracts
(whose profits are conditional upon the two types accepting them in their population
proportion) are not offered in quantities sufficient to cover the entire demand. In this
case the high-risk types’ swift reaction would result in ex-post aggregate acceptances
of pooling contracts that do not reflect the two types’ proportion in the population.
Contract providers will find themselves not meeting their profit expectations if not
incurring losses. In either case providers would eventually learn not to offer such
contracts.
These questions are irrelevant in the original Rothschild-Stiglitz model. RS’
contract providers are endowed with infinite wealth. They “specialize” in offering
a single type of contract and are obliged to supply the entire market (populated
with continuum of recipients) with it. Those conditions guarantee that if a pooling
contract is offered (and the recipients are assumed rational), it would be taken by
any of the types in their population proportion independent of the issuers’ beliefs.
However, in reality contract providers are wealth constrained, offer multiple contracts
and usually in quantities not sufficient to meet the entire demand for those contracts.
This is the also the case in our experiments, thus all of the above questions remain
pertinent within the experimental markets.
In order to prevent the indeterminacy of their model, DG introduce a refinement
of market participants’ beliefs regarding the profitability (rates of delivery of promised
returns) of contracts were they to be offered in markets that are inactive in equilibrium.
This refinement touches on the issue of local versus global adjustments. The beliefs
(regarding who is going to take it) accompanying each contract at its equilibrium price
are required to be confirmed for small price deviations only. By requiring that beliefs
regarding unopened markets be confirmed only for local price deviations, DG’s study
suggests that agents take small steps when competing against each other, around the
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prices that have already formed.
The issue of local adjustments arises more prominently in the model presented
in A.B. Ania at al. [2002] (ATW). ATW provide an evolutionary version of the
RS’ equilibrium where the dynamics are built on imitation and experimentation.6
Analogously to DG, ATW obtain the result that if the experimentation is confined
to be only local, equilibrium always exists. In their interpretation the manager of an
insurance company...
... might have an incentive to confine herself to local experiments. She
might fear that the performance of a nonlocal experiment can differ too
much from that of the contracts previously on the market, such that the
failure of such an experiment would be disastrous for her evaluations.
While there is great intuitive and theoretical appeal, the empirical success of the
above conjectures is yet to be proven. It is apparent that the existence of equilibrium
and contract allocation results of the belief-based models can change dramatically
if the assumed beliefs are not upheld. Same is valid about the issue of global vs.
local adjustments that is studied here. Predictions of models of equilibration can
differ substantially depending on the assumption they make about agents optimizing
locally or globally. The relevance of those principles of dynamics goes well beyond
the markets studied here.7 Both components, beliefs and nature of adjustments, are
necessary to determine which is the equilibrium (if any) that prevails in markets
with adverse selection. Experiments provide an excellent venue for studying those
problems and potentially for providing some guidance in the choice of appropriate
equilibrium concept.
6Note that despite each providing a dynamic story to justify the use of a particular belief
formation, all of the before-cited models are static.
7The tatonnement based models in the 60s and 70s assume that agents submit globally optimal
net trades (for a survey on the topic see [9]), while more recent models like [4] and [5] rely on local
optimization.
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2.3 Theory Overview and Notation
We study markets for contracts under asymmetric information that takes the form
of adverse selection. Although we adhere to contracts that correspond to the RS’s
insurance contracts, their exact interpretation is irrelevant for this study. The participants
in our markets are providers (or issuers), and recipients of contracts. The providers
can offer any contracts from an exogenously specified set S. They can also withdraw
any of their outstanding contracts from the market. There are two types of potential
recipients—high-risk, called H-type, and low-risk, called L-type. Recipients know
their types while issuers only know the proportion λ of H types in the population.
Each contract in the set S is defined by its four contingent payoffs, namely U rH , U
r
L,




H is the payoff to recipients of the H type, while U
r
L is the payoff to
recipients of the L type. U iH is the payoff to the issuer when the contract recipient is
of the H type. Similarly, U iL is issuer’s payoff when the recipient is of the L type.
8
When a contract is offered on the market, it can be accepted by a recipient of either
type if she finds it in her best interest to do so. Each acceptance is final, recipients
cannot cancel their acceptances.
Time is discrete and advances with market activity. Contract offerings, acceptances,
and withdrawals are what constitute activities in the market. Providers can offer and
withdraw contracts one at a time. Recipients are allowed to accept at most one
contract.
Given the nature of available contracts, the issuers have the opportunity to “screen”
the potential receivers. This can be done by wisely choosing what contracts to offer,
so that each contract lands in the hands of a receiver of a type upon which the issuer
has calculated his ex-ante profits.
Rothschild and Stiglitz were the first to show that a competitive equilibrium in
markets similar to the one described above might fail to exist.9 Whenever it exists,
8As in RS we restrict those payoffs to be each functions of two parameters (α, β) corresponding to
the coverage and the premium of the RS’ insurance contracts. Thus S ⊂ R2. Moreover the payoffs
for the recipients are required to satisfy the discrete single-crossing property (or strict increasing
differences).
9RS’ s model is static in nature. They take S to be isomorphic to R2+. The main role of the
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the RS equilibrium is comprised of a pair of contracts, each yielding zero profit for the
providers and maximizing the recipients’ payoffs subject to the incentive constraints.
An important feature that distinguishes the markets here from the original RS’
markets is the dynamic setting. Such a setting is necessary to study the principles
that take markets to equilibrium, or prevent them from ever reaching one.
The following notation although somewhat cumbersome, is necessary to define the
hypotheses informally spelled out in the previous sections.
Definition 2.3.1. SM(t) is the set of all contracts offered in the marketplace after the
activity at time t has taken place.
SM(t) belongs to the multiset of S.
10 If the activity at time t is an offering of
a contract, then SM(t) is equal to SM(t − 1) with the newly offered contract added
to it. Similarly, if the activity is a withdrawal or acceptance of a contract, SM(t) is
equal to SM(t− 1) minus the contract withdrawn or accepted at time t.
Definition 2.3.2. s(t) denotes a contract that is offered, accepted or withdrawn at
time t; s(t) ∈ S
In the present case the contract space is given by 345 contracts, labelled as follows.
S =

A1 B1 C1 · · · N1 O1
A2 B2 C2 · · · N2 O2







A23 B23 C23 · · · N23 O23

. (2.1)
If a contract, say C5, is offered, accepted or withdrawn at some time t, then s(t) = C5.
Definition 2.3.3. U(· ) is a vector function from S to R4; U(· ) = (U rH(· ), U rL(· ), U iH(· ), U iL(· )).
contract issuers in their model is to stand ready to offer a contract if a profitable opportunity arises.
Thus, the equilibrium consists of a set of contracts s.t. when contract recipients choose contracts
to maximize their payoff the following hold: (i) no contract in the equilibrium set makes negative
expected profits; and (ii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set that, if offered, will make
a nonnegative profit.
10The multiset of the set S is the collection of all subsets of S where repetition of elements of S
is also allowed.
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For example, in the experimental setup U(C5) = (50, 45,−16, 29).
Definition 2.3.4. S∗x(t), x ∈ {H, L}, is the set of contracts from SM(t) that give the
x-type recipients the highest payoff, i.e. for all s∗ ∈ S∗x(t), U rx(s∗) = maxs∈SM (t)U rx(s).
An acceptance of a contract is called undominated if the recipient has chosen a
contract that gives her the highest payoff from all the contracts in SM . In other
words, if a contract s is an undominated acceptance at time t by a recipient of type
x then it must be the case that s ∈ S∗x(t − 1). Note that choosing undominated
contracts allows for myopia. The condition is weaker than imposing full rationality
which would require that recipients optimally choose the timing of the acceptance as
well. This minimal degree of rationality is needed to test the principles of equilibration
as described in section 2.2. If recipients choose dominated contracts, accept orders
at random, or follow some other rule, the theory must be adapted to this behavior
accordingly. This motivates the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2.3.5. Recipients accept undominated offers.
If recipients accept only undominated offers then one expects the issuers to offer
“relevant” contracts as defined below.
Definition 2.3.6. A contract s that is offered at time t is called relevant if s ∈ S∗H(t)∪
S∗L(t).
Thus, a contract is relevant if it is among the contracts that provide the highest
payoffs for at least one of the types. All contracts that are not relevant are called
irrelevant. It is costless to the issuers to offer irrelevant contracts that provide them
high payoffs hoping that recipients will err and take some of them. This is the second
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2.3.7. If some of the acceptances are dominated, issuers will offer contracts
that are not relevant in addition to the relevant ones.
Definition 2.3.8. A contract s that is accepted at time t is called a pooling contract
if s ∈ S∗H(t− 1) ∩ S∗L(t− 1), and U ix(s) ≥ maxs∈S∗x(t−1)U
i
x(s), x ∈ {H, L}.
The first condition is that a pooling contract must provide the highest payoff
to both types. The second requires the payoff to the issuer be the highest among
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marketed contracts that provide payoffs to the recipients equal to their payoffs from
the pooling contract. This excludes contracts such as the RS equilibrium one, designed
for the L-type recipients and providing the highest payoff to both types, from being
qualified as pooling. This is because the H-types are indifferent between the contract
designed for them and the one designed for the L types. However, the contract
designed for L also provides lower payoff to the issuers compared the the H-contract,
when taken by an H-type recipient. Thus, the L-contract satisfies the first condition
in the definition but not the second. Exclusion of such contracts in the definition of
pooling contracts is necessary to avoid biases in the estimation of the relative frequency
with which such contracts are taken by the two types of recipients. A marginal gain
for an x-type recipient from a pooling contract s is equal to the difference between the
pooling contract’s payoff and the payoff of the contract that was the best available to
the x-type before the pooling contract was offered. The next hypothesis can be now
stated.
Hypothesis 2.3.9. Whenever pooling contracts are offered they are taken by the type
with higher marginal gain in proportion that exceeds this type’s proportion in the
population.
The above hypothesis reflects the second of the two principles discussed in the
previous section. We now turn to addressing the first one. We endow the contract
space with the following metric:
Definition 2.3.10. The distance between two contracts s′ and s′′ in SM , denoted
d(s′, s′′) is the city-block distance11 between them in S.
Definition 2.3.11. Given the grid of contracts (2.1), a contract s′ is a neighbor of
contract s′′ if maxi=1,2 |s′i − s′′i | = 1.12
If Z ⊂ S is a set of contracts, a contract s is in the neighborhood of Z if there
exists a z ∈ Z s.t. s and z are neighbors.
11In Rk, the city-block distance is the Minkowski distance d(x, y) = r
√∑
k |xi − yi|r, x, y ∈ Rk
when r = 1. In S each contract is presented by its coordinates in the matrix (2.1). For example,
the distance between A1 and B4 is equal to 3.
12For example the neighbors of contract B2 are contracts A1, A2, A3, B1, B3, C1, C2, and C3.
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We express the idea that when a new contract is introduced, it is always similar
to a contract already on the marketplace by the following hypothesis
Hypothesis 2.3.12. Each time a new contract is offered it is in the neighborhood of
the contracts already on the marketplace.
We use data from financial market experiments to test the above hypotheses. Our
experiments are characterized by a parameterization of the RS model in which the RS
equilibrium exists.13 The following section is devoted to describing the experimental
setup and procedures.
2.4 Experimental Markets
A detailed description of the experimental markets can be found in [3]. We use the
data from six experiments, conducted at Caltech, UCLA, and Sofia University in the
period between May 2001–September 2002. Briefly, the experiments are organized as
a sequence of ten to fourteen replications of the same situation. Each such replication
is called a period. The number of participants in an experimental session ranges from
13 to 23. In the beginning of each session the participants are divided into two
groups—contract providers (called sellers), and contract recipients (called buyers).
The contract recipients are then further divided into two types—called “red” type,
corresponding to the high-risk type in the model, and “blue” type, corresponding to
the low-risk type in the model.14 Next, instructions describing in detail the markets as
well as the rules according to which contract are offered and accepted are read aloud to
the participants. The type of a recipient remains private information throughout the
experiment.15 However, the proportion of H-type recipients, λ, is publicly announced.
The contract issuers are presented with a set of contracts that they can choose from
and offer to the recipients. The recipients can choose only one contract per period
13The parameterization is presented in [3].
14As usual the terms insurance contracts, high-risk, or low-risk recipients are not mentioned to
the participants.
15In some of the experiments the type of a given recipient changed from period to period but the
proportion of H-types remained the same in all periods.
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from the contracts offered on the market. They are allowed to accept a contract at
any time during a period. Recipients learn their payoff immediately after a successful
acceptance. The issuers learn their payoff from each of their transactions in the end
of each period. The contracts are organized in a table as the one presented in Figure
2.1. The contract space is a two-dimensional discrete grid, with the first coordinate
denoted by a letter, while the second is a number.16 Each contract specifies the




H , and U
i
L.
17 All payoffs are presented in a notional currency,
called francs. For example, the contract G8 has U rH = 102, U
r
L = 87, U
i
H = −52,
and U iL = 46. In the end of each experiment the earning of each participant are
converted to dollars using an exchange rate announced privately to each participant
in the beginning of the experiment. In all experiments the proportion of H-type
recipients is such that RS equilibrium exist.18 Three of the experiments are manual,
while the other three are computerized.19 Each experiment starts with a practice
period, followed by the actual periods.20
16The letters are in alphabetical order from A to O, while the numbers are from 1 to 23, for a
total of 345 contracts in S.
17U iH and U
i





below them in parentheses. Also, because the recipients need not know the payoffs of the issuers
or the other type of recipients, they are presented with a very simplified version of the payoff table
with their own payoff in each cell only.
18The equilibrium contract designed for the L-type recipients is D4, while for the H-type recipient
(due to the discretization of the contract space) there are two possible contracts - L16 and M18
that can emerge in equilibrium.
19The experiment instructions are the same in both computerized and manual experiments except
in the parts where it is explained how to submit and accept contract offers. In the computerized
experiments all communication was realized through the internet. The trading screen was updated
automatically after each offer or acceptance. In the manual experiments offers were submitted using
open outcry system. All information was recorded on a blackboard and the updating was done
manually by one of the experimenters. In all experiments contract providers were allowed to cancel
any of their outstanding offers.
20Instructions and screens for the computerized experiments can be viewed a
http://eeps4.caltech.edu/market-020603. To log on as a viewer use an identification number
1 and a password a.
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2.5 Description of the Data
The data collected from each experimental session was in common format:21 time
stamp, action (offer, acceptance, or cancellation), contract name, and contract provider
ID. If the action was an acceptance of a contract, the recipient ID, her type, as well as
the payoffs to both parties in the transaction were recorded as well. Table 2.1 provides
the numbers for each of the three market activities broken by types of experiments
(manual vs. computerized). Inspection of the table reveals that computerizing of the
experiments dramatically increases the number of the offerings and cancellations.
2.6 Results
In analyzing the data, we abstract from the problem of whether experimental markets
reach equilibrium. That they actually do is reported in a companion paper [3].
The minimal rationality requirement on the recipients, namely that they do not
choose dominated contracts, is tested first. The results from our experiments show
that recipients seldom choose dominated contracts from the set of marketed contracts.
Table 2.2 displays the dominated acceptances by types. The proportion of dominated
acceptances is 0.08 in the manual experiments, 0.21 in the computerized, and 0.16
for the pooled data. If only the second half of each experiment is considered, then
the numbers are 0.03, 0.08, and 0.07 respectively. Those findings provide support for
Hypothesis 2.3.5. If there are any dominated acceptances they are almost entirely
eliminated in the second half of the experiments. Therefore the acceptances in our
markets pass the minimal degree of rationality needed for testing the remaining
hypotheses.
It is possible that the higher proportion of dominated acceptances in the computerized
experiments is caused by the enormous amount of offers that recipients have to
process before making a decision on accepting one.22 Interestingly, once providers
21The data files are available from the author upon request
22If recipients make more mistakes as the number of offers increases this would prompt issuers to
offer even more irrelevant contract to “confuse” the recipients.
60
discover that recipients make small mistakes they can exploit this by offering irrelevant
contracts as posed in Hypothesis 2.3.7. Table 2.3 presents the raw statistics for
the offers from the manual and computerized experiments. Approximately only a
third of the offers in each of the two sets of experiments are relevant. If some of
those irrelevant offers were caused by confusion one should expect their proportion to
decrease in the second half of the experiments. Those results are reported in Table
2.4. The proportion of relevant offers does increase in the computerized experiments
but decreases in the manual. Thus despite the fact that in all experiments conversion
to the equilibrium traded contracts is observed, the proportion of irrelevant offers
overall does not decrease as the experimental sessions progress. The reasoning that
it is costless for the providers to offer irrelevant contracts in hope to get mistaken
recipients is one explanation. Another is that offering irrelevant contracts might serve
an auxiliary purpose such as attracting the attention of the recipients into certain
areas of contracts. Other possible explanations for this finding and/or confirmation
of the above ones are left for further investigation.
Next we turn to testing Hypothesis 2.3.9. In our experimental markets we are able
to verify what pooling contracts are offered and accepted in the marketplace, and also
compute the marginal gains from such contracts for both types.23 Table 2.5 displays
the raw statistics for acceptances of pooling contracts in all six experiments.24 The
Pearson χ2 test cannot reject the hypothesis that the frequency of H-type acceptances
of pooling contracts coincides with λ (the table also shows the different values for λ
in the six sessions). In order to test Hypothesis 2.3.9, the marginal gains from trade
should be accounted for. We split the sample of pooling acceptances into two groups.
The first consists of pooling contract acceptances when the high-risk types have higher
marginal gains from taking the contract. In this subsample the Pearson χ2 test again
cannot reject the hypothesis that the frequency of H-type acceptances of pooling
contracts coincides with λ. The same result obtains for the second subsample with
23Note that marginal gains are hard if not impossible to compute with field data for it requires
knowledge of not only what contract was taken but also what the best possible alternative was before
this contract was offered.
24All pooling contracts are presented in Table ??.
61
acceptances for which the low-risk recipients have higher gains from trade.
The latter findings do not provide support for the conjecture that the DG-type
beliefs are confirmed when pooling off-equilibrium contracts are actually offered.
Despite providing no empirical evidence for one of the possible beliefs that can
keep issuers from offering pooling contracts, we are still faced with the question of
whether issuers take only local steps in competing with one another. In other words,
do contract providers compete by offering contracts that are “similar” to the ones
that are already offered.
To test Hypothesis 2.3.12 we take the set of all offers (in chronological order).
For each offer we compute the distance from the newly offered contract to the set
of already marketed offers. Then we tabulate the distribution of the newly offered
contracts whose distance to the set of marketed contracts is positive. Because neighbors
of a given contract can be at distance 1 or 2 from this contract, we assign a value of
1.5 instead of 2 to the diagonal neighbors. The tabulated distributions of distances
are presented in Table 2.6. In the upper portion of the table all nonzero distances
are tabulated. More than a fifth of all newly introduced contracts are at distance 3
or larger, and at least 15 percent are at distance 4 or larger.
Very often the first couple of contracts introduced in the beginning of each period
are somewhat around the two RS equilibrium contracts. Those initial offerings are
therefore bound to be very far away from each other. In the bottom of Table 2.6
we present the results with the first three contracts with positive distance from the
set of marketed contracts excluded from the sample. More than 15 percent of those
offers are contracts that are at distance 3 or larger from the set of already marketed
contracts. Hypothesis 2.3.12 is therefore rejected in the data. Thus the claim that
agents make only local adjustments is not borne by the data. This suggest that
equilibria based on a local adjustment assumption are not likely to be observed when
dropping the assumption results in non-existence of equilibrium.
62
2.7 Conclusions
This paper uses experimental evidence to test several hypotheses about individual
behavior in markets with adverse selection. The first main conjecture that is tested is
that when pooling contracts are offered they are taken by the type of recipients with
higher marginal gains in proportion that exceeds their proportion in the population.
The data does not support the above hypothesis. We find that when a pooling
contract is offered, it is taken by the two types of recipients in their proportion in the
population independent of the gains from trade. The other significant finding is that
agents do not take only local steps in introducing new contracts. Approximately a
fifth of the time they make non-local moves. With abundance of experimental data
the local adjustment hypothesis can be tested in other setting as well. This would
provide further guidance in constructing theoretical models of market behavior. In
markets with adverse selection, however, agents’ behavior has little resemblance to
what such local movement theories predict.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Experimental Market Activity
Offers Cancelations Acceptances All Activities
manual 1644 4 303 1951
computer 10024 525 561 11110
total 11668 529 864 13061
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Table 2.2: Undominated Acceptances
Undominated H Undominated L All Acceptances
manual 152 128 303
computer 257 185 561
totals 409 313 864











Table 2.5: Purchases of Pooling Contracts
Date Sample Accepted by H Accepted by L λ
10625 All 7 4 5/9
Higher Blue Gain 2 1 5/9
Higher Red Gain 5 3 5/9
10817 All 1 0 6/11
Higher Blue Gain 6/11
Higher Red Gain 1 0 6/11
10818 All 10 11 6/11
Higher Blue Gain 4 3 6/11
Higher Red Gain 6 8 6/11
20603 All 12 13 8/15
Higher Blue Gain 1 3 8/15
Higher Red Gain 11 10 8/15
20718 All 17 15 9/14
Higher Blue Gain 17 15 9/14
Higher Red Gain 9/14
20919 All 4 12 9/17
Higher Blue Gain 3 4 9/17








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Economists have generally focused on the equilibrium implications of their models,
leaving little time to consider how markets attain equilibrium. This focus is motivated
by the claim that prices change in the direction of excess demand. If excess demand
is positive (there is more demand than supply), prices tend to increase. Conversely,
if excess demand is negative (supply outstrips demand), then prices tend to decrease.
As a result, price adjustment only stops at the point where excess demand equals
zero—the equilibrium.1
Evidence is presented here, however, that markets do not necessarily adjust as
suggested in economic theory. We study the outcomes in financial markets experiments
where up to 70 (human) subjects traded 4 securities for real money. One of the
securities was risk-free, and the other three were risky. Prices of none of the risky
securities react significantly to their excess demand, contrary to the presumption in
economic theory. The lack of reaction of a security’s price to its excess demand is
caused by the presence of excess demand in other securities. Evidently, prices in
1The claim that, if prices adjust in the direction of excess demand, then equilibrium will be
reached, does not hold for all preferences that are theoretically imaginable. It is easy to construct
counterexamples (see, e.g., [12]). The counterexamples exploit the fact that no general shape
restrictions exist for excess demand as a function of prices (this fundamental result is known as the
Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein Theorem). It is an empirical (and open) question, however, whether
preferences that generate weird excess demand, and hence, non-convergence, occur naturally. If not,
then the counterexamples are a mere theoretical curiosity, and hence, of no further consequence.
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one market react to excess demand in other markets, even if there is no direct link
between markets.2 Such cross-effects are not only surprising; economists generally
consider them to be contrary to intuition, because it may imply that the price of a
good falls when it is in excess demand.3
The cross-security effects were first discovered in experimental markets with three
securities (two risky; one risk-free); see [2]. This paper demonstrates that the effects
are replicable. In addition, the four-security environment reveals rich patterns in
the signs and magnitudes of the covariances between a security’s price changes and
other securities’ excess demands, which [2] could not detect, because they investigated
experiments with only two risky securities.
The cross-security effects are all the more puzzling because prices and allocations
in the experiments are otherwise well behaved. Demand and supply can be modelled
in a way that has become standard in finance, namely, by assuming that subjects
trade off expected payoff against risk as measured by variance. The moderate level
of risk in the experiment justifies subjects’ tendency to ignore higher-order moments
(e.g., skewness). Substantial evidence has by now been collected that prices – and
allocations, modulo a random error term—in experimental settings indeed tend to
those predicted by equilibrium theory based on mean-variance preferences, namely,
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).4 This model has the advantage that the
exact trade-off that individual subjects make between expected return and risk (i.e.,
their risk aversion) need not be known to determine whether prices and allocations
satisfy equilibrium restrictions, or even to determine whether prices change in the
direction of excess demand. That is, the findings in this paper do not depend on
knowledge of this trade-off parameter.
We present a model of price pressure that could explain not only the presence
of the cross-security effects, but also, as turns out, their signs and even magnitude.
Regarding the latter, the experiments reveal a systematic relationship between the
2Order execution in one market is not contingent on events in other markets.
3In a influential text on equilibrium theory, [1], p. 304, it is argued that acceptable equilibration
processes must have the property that the price of a good falls when the good is in excess supply.
4See [3, 5].
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cross-security effects and the covariances of the final payoffs of the securities: if two
securities have negatively correlated payoffs, then their prices tend to be negatively
correlated with each other’s excess demands (vice versa if the correlation is positive);
moreover, the magnitude of the cross-security effects is related to that of the payoff
covariances.
Ours is a model of price pressure. It describes the mechanics of price changes
when agents encounter difficulties trading to what we will refer to as their aspiration
levels. In this paper, we will take the aspiration level to be the optimal positions
at last transaction prices. That is, aspiration levels equal present positions plus
excess demands. These are also the aspiration levels in the classical Walrasian
tatonnement. The ensuing price adjustment in the Walrasian model, however, is
mechanical and fictitious, without any obvious relationship to actual processes in
decentralized markets: a security’s price changes in proportion to its excess demand.
Here, we spell out how agents react when their orders (which are based on their
aspiration levels) fail to get executed. We conjecture that agents scale back their
aspiration levels proportionally. Marginal valuations are updated correspondingly,
i.e., prices at which agents are willing to trade are revised. Mean order prices, and
as a result, prices at which subsequent transactions are likely to occur, change.
Price pressure in our model is driven by local changes in marginal valuations,
which in turn are dictated by the Hessian of agents’ utility functions. In the case
of mean-variance preferences, the Hessian is proportional to the covariance matrix of
the final payoffs. When covariances are nonzero, not only does our model therefore
predict the presence of cross-security effects, but also that these cross-security effects
are related to the sign and even the magnitude of these covariances. The experimental
data confirm this. Our model therefore enjoys additional empirical support from a
quite surprising angle.
The scope of our model is limited. It only deals with the mechanics of the direction
in which prices change given unattainable aspiration levels. That is, ours is a model
of price pressure, and not of, e.g., equilibration. Nevertheless, it could be embedded
in a model of equilibration. One possibility is the following. As aspiration levels are
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scaled back and marginal valuations change correspondingly, the average order price
changes as well, to the point that agents may decide to cancel their orders altogether
and re-submit new orders that reflect their excess demands at these revised average
order prices. We will not explore the implications, but, in the conclusion, we speculate
to what extent this extension of our model would guarantee stability.
Likewise, our model takes aspiration levels to be globally optimal demands given
last transaction prices. One could define aspiration levels differently. For instance, in
the models of [4, 6, 9, 14], aspiration levels are current allocations plus changes that
are locally optimal given previous transaction prices. In the context of mean-variance
preferences, however, the empirical implications (in particular, the link between cross-
security effects and payoff covariances) can be shown to be the same qualitatively.
Our model is meant to capture price pressure in novel environments, where agents
cannot plausibly have formed expectations about the equilibration path. We are
thinking about situations where agents meet for the first time, or when their endowments
have changed unpredictably and in ways unknown to others. They cannot guess how
long price adjustment will last, or even whether markets have reached equilibrium. As
a consequence, they cannot envisage the opportunities they may face when postponing
trade. In essence, they are forced to act in a myopic way. As the trading environment
is repeated, it is reasonable to expect that agents start forming rational expectations
about the price discovery process. As a consequence, they will alter their strategies
accordingly. An interesting approach to modelling the ensuing learning has recently
been suggested in [7]. In this paper, we abstract from such learning.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the experiments. In Section 3.3, the excess demands are derived in the model that has
proven to be useful in predicting final prices and holdings in the experiments, namely,
the CAPM. Subsequently, we present empirical evidence of the extent to which prices
in our experiments fail to change in the direction of excess demand because of cross-
security effects. In Section 3.5 we develop a theory of price pressure that explains the
observed cross-security effects. Further implications of the model, about the signs
and magnitudes of the cross-security effects, are verified in Section 3.6. Section 3.7
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concludes.
3.2 Description of the Experiments
The experiments5 are organized as a sequence of several replications of the same
situation. Each replication is referred to as a period. At the beginning of a period,
(human) subjects are given a number of securities and cash. They have the opportunity
to trade the securities for cash during a pre-set amount of time. After trading ends, a
state is drawn randomly, on the basis of which each of the securities pays a liquidating
dividend. Subjects keep the dividends (the amount depends on the number of each
of the securities they hold), as well as their end-of-period cash holdings, minus a pre-
fixed charge. The securities are taken away when a period is over. Then a new period
starts, whereby subjects are given a fresh allocation, identical to that in the previous
period. The accumulated earnings from previous periods are fully exposed to risk.
That is, if in a given period a subject loses money, then the amount is subtracted
from the total earnings in previous periods. If a subject’s cumulative earnings remain
negative for more than two periods in a row, he or she is excluded from further
trading.6
There are four securities in the experiment. One security, which we label Notes,
is risk-free and can be held in positive or negative amounts (i.e., can be sold short);7
the other three securities A, B, C are risky and can only be held in non-negative
amounts (i.e., cannot be sold short). Cash and Notes are perfect substitutes at the
5The three experiments discussed here were conducted between October 1999 and November
2000.
6This bankruptcy rule causes rational subjects to be more risk averse in earlier periods than they
would be if the experiment had been organized as a single trading period. When bankrupting,
subjects forego the opportunity of making money in subsequent periods. To avoid bankruptcy,
subjects therefore should invest more cautiously in earlier periods. Subjects evidently understand
this: the number of shortsale–constrained subjects increases with time. Hence, our bankruptcy
rule makes it possible to study asset pricing (which relies on risk aversion) even if subjects are risk
neutral. It is well known, however, that most subjects exhibit risk aversion beyond that induced by
our bankruptcy rule, even at the levels of risk in our experiments. So, our bankruptcy rule is not
necessary to study asset pricing in the laboratory. See [5] for details.
7When selling short a Note, the seller promises to pay the face value of the Note to the buyer
when the Note expires. Effectively, the seller borrows the purchase price; the face value of the Note
acts as the loan amount, inclusive of interest.
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end of a period. However, because assets can only be traded for cash, cash also has
a transactions value during a trading period, which often showed up as a discount in
the price of the Notes relative to their payoff.
At the outset of a period, the state is unknown, but the true (objective) distribution
of the states is public information. Between the opening and the closing of the market,
no information about the state is revealed, and no credits are made to subjects’
accounts. Nobody has privileged information about upcoming states. All this is
common knowledge.
Periods are independent. Each subject is given the same endowment in successive
periods, but is not informed of the endowments of others, whether endowments of
others were the same in successive periods, of the total endowment,8 or even of the
number of subjects in a given experiment, for that matter. All accounting in the
experiments is done in terms of a fictitious currency called francs, exchanged for U.S.
dollars at the end of the experiment at a pre-announced exchange rate (4 U.S. cents
per franc). The parameters for all experiments are given in Table 3.1.
There are four states W, X, Y, Z, on the basis of which liquidating dividends are
determined. The state-dependent dividends of the securities (in francs) are recorded
in Table 3.2. Cash is risk-free: one unit of cash is one franc in each state of nature.
States were drawn equally likely and independently across periods. That is, the
chance of any state occurring remained 1/4 throughout the experiment.
All communication took place over the internet.9 Trading was organized through
8The total endowment of risky securities is referred to in the finance literature as the market
portfolio. Special care was exerted not to provide information about the market portfolio, so that
subjects could not readily deduce the nature of aggregate risk — lest they attempt to use a standard
theoretical model to predict prices, rather than to take observed prices as given. Economic theory
does not require that participants have any more information than is provided in the experiment.
Indeed, much of the power of economic theory comes precisely from the fact that agents know only
market prices and their own preferences and endowments.
9Instructions and screens for the experiments we discuss here can be viewed at
http://eeps2.caltech.edu/market-991026/, http://eeps3.caltech.edu/market-001030/, and
http://eeps3.caltech.edu/market-001106/ respectively. Use identification number:1 and password:a
to login as a viewer. The reader will not have a payoff but will be able to see the forms used. If
the reader wishes to interact with the software in a different context, visit http://eeps.caltech.edu
and go to the experiment and then demo links. This exercise will provide the reader with some
understanding of how the software works.
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parallel, unconnected, continuous electronic open books.10 This architecture is heavily
used in purely electronic financial markets around the world (including the Paris, Tel
Aviv and Toronto stock exchanges). Subjects were given clear instructions, which
included descriptions of some portfolio strategies (but no suggestions as to which
strategies were better). Most of the subjects had at least some sophistication in
economics in general and with financial markets in particular. The subjects were
drawn from the Caltech community of undergraduate and graduate students. The
average payment was $60, with a minimum of $0 (those who went bankrupt) and a
maximum of approximately $150 for a three-hour experiment.
3.3 Modelling Excess Demands
It is documented elsewhere (see [3, 5]) that prices and allocations in experiments like
the ones described in the previous section tend to reflect mean-variance preferences.
That is, prices and allocations move in a direction that reveals a concern to optimally
trade off expected payoff against risk (as measured by variance). In other words,





where x denotes the random variable representing one’s final payoff, n is a subject
index (n = 1, ..., N), and bn is a subject-specific constant (reflecting the magnitude
of risk aversion).
Therefore, a subject can be characterized by an endowment (h0n, z
0
n) of the Note
and the (vector of) risky securities, and by the risk-aversion coefficient bn. Write
Dj(s) for the end-of-period payoff on the j-th risky asset (j = A, B, C) in state
s ∈ S, where S = {W, X, Y, Z}. Thus, when holding hn units of the Notes and the
10The software that implements the system is called Marketscape.
77
vector zn of risky securities, a subject will have random final payoff of
xn = 100hn + zn,ADA + zn,BDB + zn,CDC ,
and will enjoy utility as given in (3.1).
The four states in our setup are equally likely. Let µ be the vector of expected
payoffs of risky assets and Ω = [cov (Dj, Dk)] be the covariance matrix. The state-
dependent payoffs are displayed in Table 3.2. They imply the following mean payoff













Using µ and Ω, we can rewrite the utility function (3.1) in a more convenient form,
directly as a function of the final holdings of risk-free and risky securities, (hn, zn):
Un(hn, zn) = 100hn + [zn · µ]−
bn
2
[zn · Ωzn]. (3.4)
We normalize the price of the Notes to be 100.11 Write p for the vector of prices of
risky securities. Given prices p, the feasible investments, i.e., the budget set, consists
of portfolios (h, z) that satisfy the following budget constraint:
100hn + p · zn ≤ 100h0n + p · z0n. (3.5)
Assume that the budget constraint is binding at the optimum. The utility function
11At a price of 100, there is no arbitrage opportunity between cash and Notes.
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can then be re-written as a function of holdings of risky securities only:
Un(h
0
n + p · (z0n − zn), zn) = h0n + p · z0n + zn · (µ− p)−
bn
2
(zn · Ωzn) .
From the first-order conditions that characterize the optimum,12 an investor’s









Ω−1(µ− p)− z0n. (3.6)










The per-capita excess demand is equivalent to that of an agent with endowment equal
to the per capita endowment and risk-aversion coefficient equal to the harmonic mean










Armed with the above expressions, we are now ready to verify whether price
changes are proportional to aggregate excess demand, as postulated in the standard
Walrasian equilibration model.
12The second-order conditions are satisfied because of strict concavity of the utility function.
13Note that demand is independent of wealth. In the original version of the Walrasian model,
the tatonnement version, no trade takes place before prices settle. In extensions, referred to as
non-tatonnement models, trade is allowed to take place, potentially generating wealth effects on
the way towards equilibrium. Since demand is independent of wealth in our context, there will not
be wealth effects, and hence, the distinction between tatonnement and non-tatonnement is without
consequence (as far as the Walrasian model is concerned).
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3.4 Walrasian Price Adjustment: Empirical Evidence
In the Walrasian model, prices change in the direction of own excess demand. The
model is highly stylized. It certainly does not literally describe what is going on
in continuous computerized double auctions such as the ones we use in the financial
markets experiments. Nevertheless, the Walrasian model captures the essence of what
economists often informally claim justifies equilibrium theory, namely, that prices are
pushed in the direction of excess demand.14 It also captures the intuition that if there
are no direct links between different markets (e.g., through the ability to submit limit
orders in one market that depend on prices in other markets), prices in one market
cannot adjust to excess demand in another.
In a nutshell, the Walrasian model makes the following prediction.
Hypothesis W : The price of a security adjusts in the direction of its own
excess demand; excess demands in other securities have no influence.
Figure 3.1 provides visual evidence that refutes the first part of Hypothesis W.
It plots all intra-period transaction price changes in the first experiment (26 Oct
99) against own excess demand. There is no evidence of any relationship, let alone
positive. When excess demand is negative (i.e., when there is excess supply), there
is no more tendency for prices to decrease than when excess demand is positive (i.e.,
demand outstrips supply). The lack of correlation between price changes and excess
demand is caused by significant cross-security effects that act as confounding factors.
That is, the second part of Hypothesis W is also wrong, and is the reason why the
first part fails. We now document this formally.
Let k denote transaction time, i.e., transactions are indexed k = 1, 2, .... According
to the Walrasian model,
pk − pk−1 = Λze(pk−1),
where Λ is a diagonal matrix with positive constants. An empirically viable version
of the Walrasian model must, however, take into account the inherent randomness
14As mentioned before, the property that prices adjust in the direction of excess demand cannot
be a complete justification of equilibrium theory, because it does not guarantee equilibration.
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of changes in prices. An error term has to be included and suitable restrictions have
to be imposed on it. We propose the following stochastic difference equation for
transaction price changes.
pk − pk−1 = Λze(pk−1) + εk, (3.7)
where the noise εk is assumed to be mean zero and uncorrelated with past public
information as well as with past excess demand.15
We test this model by projecting transaction price changes onto estimates of per-
capita excess demand. Excess demand equals demand minus supply. Per capita
supply varies hardly during an experiment, so for all practical purposes, it can be
considered constant.16 Per-capita demand can only be measured up to a constant of
proportionality, namely, the harmonic mean risk aversion B, which is unknown. We
borrow the estimate from [5] (which is based on end-of-period prices and portfolio
choices), namely, B̂ = 10−3.17 Because supply does not change (for all practical
purposes), the error in the estimation of B is absorbed in the intercept when projecting
price changes onto (our estimates of) aggregate excess demands.18
Inspection of the projection results revealed that the error term was affected
by heteroscedasticity. White’s test to detect heteroscedasticity confirmed this. As
a result, we report standard errors that have been adjusted using White’s general
correction for heteroscedasticity.
Table 3.3 displays the projection results. Unlike expected after the visual evidence
15It should be noted that past excess demand in general may not be public information, so our
requiring that the error term be independent of past excess demand is rather ad hoc.
16Only bankruptcies may lead to changes in per-capita supplies.
17The same estimate is used to compute per-capita excess demands used in Figure 3.1.
18To see this, consider (3.7), and re-write it such that estimated aggregate excess demand shows
up on the right hand side:















where ẑe(pk−1) = B̂−1Ω−1(µ−pk−1)−z̄, i.e. the aggregate excess demand when the actual harmonic







in Figure 3.1, prices are positively correlated with excess demand. In six cases,
the correlation is significant (at p-level equal to 0.05). The origin of the apparent
discrepancy between Figure 3.1 and Table 3.3 is obvious, however: contrary to
the predictions of the Walrasian model, two-thirds of the cross-security effects are
significantly different from zero. That is, excess demands in other securities operate
as confounding factors in the relationship between a security’s price changes and its
own excess demand.
The results replicate and extend the findings in [2], who also report evidence of
significant cross-security effects, in eight large-scale financial markets experiments
involving two risky and one risk-free securities. Likewise, our results confirm the
significant cross-security effects discovered in four experiments with three securities,
whereby mean-variance preferences were induced not through uncertainty, but by
paying subjects directly according to the schedule provided in (3.4). The latter results
are reported in [4].
3.5 An Alternative Model of Price Pressure
The significant cross-security effects refute the price adjustment story in the Walrasian
model. Perhaps this is not surprising. In our experiments, price adjustment is not
facilitated by a benevolent auctioneer, unlike in the Walrasian model.19 Price pressure
emerges endogenously, through order submission.
In a double auction setting, it is more plausible that prices change because of
changes in valuations induced by changes in expectations about executable trades.
We present a model of price pressure that builds on this conjecture. Unlike the
Walrasian model, ours predicts the very cross-security effects that are present in the
data. It does more: it links the signs and even relative magnitudes of the cross-
security effects to corresponding elements in the Hessian of the utility functions on
which excess demands are based. When we return to the data, we confirm this
additional implication. As such, our model appears to be built on solid empirical
19For a similar criticism, see, e.g., [8].
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foundation.
To set the stage, we make two assumptions about individual behavior in a competitive,
decentralized market setting.
1. In the short run, agents’ actions are quantity-driven. Agents desire to trade
particular quantities, to be referred to as aspiration levels. To the extent that
agents sense that they will not be able to trade up to their aspiration levels,
they scale back proportionally. However, agents with higher risk aversion are
less eager to move away from their original aspiration levels than more risk
tolerant agents.
2. The environment is competitive, taken to mean that agents only hurt themselves
when they bid less than the expected utility upon execution of the trades. In
the absence of asymmetric information, there is no winner’s curse, so agents
should not expect losses when bidding their marginal valuation. Hence, along
with order quantities, agents submit prices that reflect the marginal valuation
of their holdings conditional on eventually reaching aspiration levels.
Thus, price pressure in our model originates in changes in aspiration levels in response
to lack of execution of orders.
We refrain from making assumptions about order quantities. They may be mechanically
tied to the volume needed to move to aspiration levels (e.g., a fixed fraction), but
need not. Order quantities can be large or small – the latter being more typical of
the continuous markets in our experiments. In contrast, order prices are determined
by the aspiration levels that agents eventually expect to attain. If order size is small,
then many orders may generally have to be executed before attaining one’s aspiration
point. Still, as long as the aspiration point does not change, marginal valuations, and
hence, order prices will remain the same for all these orders. Therefore, our theory is
one of (order) prices, not of quantities.20
20When weighted with the inverse of the limit order quantities, the average order prices are
correlated with aggregate excess demands. See [2] for evidence. Therefore, it appears that limit order
quantities are disproportionately higher on the ask side when there is aggregate excess demand, and
disproportionately lower on the bid side when there is aggregate excess supply. Again, cross-security
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Agents submit limit orders. There is no role in our model for market orders. A
richer version of our theory ought to distinguish between market and limit orders, in
order to generate a full theory of the evolution of transaction prices.21 We merely
focus on the mean limit order price and how it changes as aspiration levels change.
The expected price at which the next transaction occurs will, however, be related
to the mean order price. Therefore, our model indirectly makes predictions about
changes in transaction prices.
Although other choices are possible, we take the initial aspiration level to be the
optimal investment point at prevailing prices. The latter are prices at which agents
expect to be able to trade. For simplicity, we take these to be the prices at which
transactions last occurred. As in the Walrasian model, therefore, aspiration levels are
determined by (globally optimal) excess demands at past prices. A different choice
would lead to a different model. For instance, in [4, 6, 9, 14], aspiration levels are
determined by locally optimal movements.
As mentioned above, once they experience delays in execution of orders, agents
scale back their aspiration levels, and revise order prices correspondingly (and, if
desired, order quantities as well). It is clear that a market where agents merely
shrink their aspiration levels towards their present holdings may never equilibrate.
But the revision of aspiration levels generates corresponding revisions in order prices.
As a result, the mean order price, and hence, the price at which transactions can be
expected to occur, changes. At one point, many agents will perceive their marginal
valuations at (revised) aspiration levels to be way different from the mean order price.
These agents may wish to revise their aspiration levels based on the new prevailing
prices rather than continuing to mechanically scale back their aspiration levels. We
assume that this occurs after each transaction.
Again, our theory is silent about the origin of transactions, for it does not distinguish
between limit and market orders. Our theory merely predicts at which prices transaction
effects complicate this picture. But this evidence suggests that limit order quantities are not simply
a fraction of (individual) excess demands. At the same time, the documented regularity indicates
that order quantities are not random. The regularity could inspire new theoretical developments.
21Transactions occur when a market order is sent in (or equivalently, a limit buy order with limit
price above the best ask or a limit sell order with a limit price below the best bid).
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can be expected. Transactions may not take place on average at precisely the mean
order prices. That is, there may be a bias in the mean order prices in predicting the
next transaction prices. Econometrically, we will be able to accommodate any such
bias.
Let us now discuss the mathematical details. We model price adjustment in
continuous time. This allows us to characterize local price adjustment in terms
of differential equations. Let t denote (calendar) time,22 and the differential dt an
infinitesimal change in time. As before, we concentrate on the price dynamics in the
markets for the risky securities only, because we take Notes as the numeraire.
We need the following notation, some of which we already used in the discrete
time setup of section 3.3.
zn(t) − Investor n’s current holdings (vector), or endowment at time t
zen(p) − Investor n’s individual excess demand vector, a function of the price vector p
z̃n(t) − Investor n’s order at time t








, the Hessian of Un, namely, the negative of bnΩ
At some point t0, a transaction has taken place. The transaction price becomes
the new reference price p0 on which basis agents update their aspiration levels. The
adjusted aspiration levels are determined by optimal positions at the new reference
price. So, agent n needs to trade z̃n(t
0) = zen(p
0) in order to reach his or her aspiration
level. Agents then submit a batch of (new) orders that move them into the direction
of their aspiration levels. Order prices are set equal to the marginal valuations
conditional on reaching the aspiration levels. Obviously, the marginal valuations
will be the same for all agents, and equal to the reference price. That is, orders are
submitted at a price pn(t
0) = ∇Un(zn(t0) + z̃n(t0)) = p0.
22The index t is reserved for calendar time, while k indexes transactions.
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In general, markets will not clear, i.e., investors’ orders cannot all be filled simultaneously.
They would if, e.g., p0 happens to be the equilibrium price and order quantities are
a fixed fraction of excess demands. Order imbalance makes agents nervous about
the possibility of eventually reaching their aspiration levels. Agents react by scaling







where λ > 0. Note that agents with higher risk aversion (higher bn) are assumed to
scale back less. Agents update order prices (if not order quantities), to reflect changes
in their marginal valuation as a result of changes in aspiration levels. Therefore, agent











As a consequence, the mean order price vector p, and hence, the prices at which















We assume that agents continue to revise orders until the next trade takes place, at
time t1. The transaction is expected to occur at the mean order price p(t1) (although
we allow for a bias – to be discussed shortly). At this point, agents have a new common
reference price p1, and they revise their aspiration levels and their orders accordingly.
Unless the market clears instantaneously, a new round of order adjustment ensues.
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The transaction at t1 is expected to occur at the mean order price p(t1). To
accommodate potential biases, we assume that the transaction price p1 is related to
p(t1) as follows:
p1 = α + p(t1) + ε1,
where ε1 is mean-zero white noise. A discrete approximation of Equation (3.9) implies
that p(t1) is related to p0 as follows:
p(t1)− p0 = λΩze(p0)(t1 − t0).
Consequently, the change in the vector of transaction prices equals:
p1 − p0 = α + λΩze(p0)(t1 − t0) + ε1.
Generalizing this for transactions at points tk (k = 1, 2, ...), and assuming that
transactions occur at regular intervals in time (which we scale to be equal to 1),
we obtain the following stochastic difference equation:
pk − pk−1 = α + λΩze(pk−1) + εk. (3.10)
This is a system of differential equations that determines the drift in prices. That
is, (3.9) provides a model of price pressure. The drift in prices is given by λΩze(p0).
Like the Walrasian model, the form of the drift implies that prices react positively to
own excess demand. However, it also implies that the price of an asset reacts to the
excess demands in markets for other assets as well. This is precisely what happened
in the experiments. Consequently, our model explains the observed cross-security
effects.
Our model generates an additional implication. (3.9) predicts that the drift in
the price of one security depends on the excess demand of other securities through
the corresponding covariances in final payoffs. That is, cross-effects are proportional
to the covariances between the assets involved. This is a surprising finding that we
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confront with the data in the next section.
The intuition behind our theory is conveyed in Figure 3.2. As explained in the
caption, marginal valuations are determined by the curvature of the indifference
curves. This means that changes in marginal valuations are determined by the Hessian
of the utility function, which is proportional here to the covariance matrix. Therefore,
as aspiration levels change, marginal valuations change as dictated variances and
covariances. Changes in marginal valuations ultimately translate into changes in
order prices in a competitive market.
It deserves emphasis that, unlike in the empirical version of the Walrasian model
[see Equation (3.7)], the error term in (3.10) is structural. It is not simply inserted
for econometric convenience, but reflects the fact that transaction prices are random
draws from a distribution indexed by the mean order prices.
3.6 The Data Revisited
The testable implications of the model presented in the previous section can be
summarized as follows. The change in the price of each asset reacts to the excess
demands of (possibly) all assets. The relation between one asset’s price and another
asset’s excess demand is positive (negative) if and only if the covariance between the
two assets is positive (negative). This gives the first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis A : The signs of the slope coefficients in the projection of price
changes onto excess demands coincide with the signs of the corresponding elements
in the covariance matrix Ω.
Our model, however, implies an even stronger relation between the matrix of
slope coefficients and the covariance matrix Ω, namely, that one is proportional to
the other with strictly positive coefficient of proportionality. This gives rise to the
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis B : The matrix of slope coefficients is proportional to Ω with some
positive constant of proportionality κ.
To test Hypothesis A, we re-examine the estimation results reported in Table 3.3.
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In only one out of eighteen instances does the sign of an off-diagonal slope coefficient
not match that of its counterpart in the covariance matrix. Moreover, all nine
significant cross-security effects bear signs coinciding with those of the corresponding
element in Ω. These results provide very strong support for Hypothesis A, and
therefore for our model of price pressure.
Next we turn to testing the proportionality between the slope coefficient matrix
and Ω, Hypothesis B. Let l denote the row vector formed by concatenating the three
rows of the matrix of slope coefficients in the projection of the vector of price changes
onto the vector of excess demands. We use Wald’s statistic to test the linear restriction
Rl′ = 0, where
R =

ω12 −ω11 0 . . . 0
ω13 0 −ω11 . . . 0






ω33 0 0 . . . −ω11

.
The above linear restriction is equivalent to Hypothesis B but without imposing
positivity on κ.
The Wald statistics are reported in Table 3.4. In two of three experiments,
Hypothesis B cannot be rejected. It is rejected at the 5% level in the first experiment,
however. Only 29 subjects participated in this experiment as opposed to 68 and 69 in
the other two, so that the discrepancy may be due to differences in market thickness.
With our Wald statistic, no restriction is imposed on the sign of the constant
of proportionality. According to Hypothesis B, it should be positive (κ > 0). To
ascertain whether it is, we estimate the restricted model where the slope coefficient
matrix is proportional to Ω and test whether the constant of proportionality is
positive.23 The t-statistics for the three experiments are 3.22, 3.67, and 4.77, respectively,
thus providing further confirmation of Hypothesis B.
23We implement this by regressing the vector of price changes (resulting from concatenating each
of the three price-change vectors) on a constant, dummy variables for the individual securities, and
the excess demands multiplied by the corresponding elements of the covariance matrix.
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3.7 Conclusion
Data from large-scale market experiments with four securities reject the simple price
adjustment story in the Walrasian model because of significant cross-security effects:
price changes correlate not only with own excess demand but with excess demands
of other securities as well. This extends the findings of [2] and [4].
In this paper, we study a model of price pressure that enriches the basic Walrasian
model, replacing its mechanical price adjustment rule with a model of price changes
that better reflects the realities of competitive, decentralized markets. The agents in
our model in the short run scale back their aspiration points in response to delays in
execution, and change order prices accordingly, to reflect corresponding changes in
their marginal valuations.
Our model of price pressure implies the very cross-security effects present in the
data. In addition, it predicts the sign and relative magnitude of the cross-effects.
Basically, as agents scale back their aspiration points, their marginal valuations
change. The Hessian of the utility functions dictates how marginal valuations change.
In the context of mean-variance preferences, the Hessian is proportional to the covariance
matrix of final payoffs. This means that covariances provide the natural linkage
between marginal valuation changes in one security and adjustments of desired quantities
in another. Since changes in marginal valuations are revealed in changes in order
prices, the pattern of covariances in payoffs show up in the way prices drift as a
response to excess demands. The experimental data confirm the hypothesized link
between cross-security effects and the structure of the covariance matrix.
Although our model fits the data well, we leave many questions unanswered.
Foremost, ours is a model of local price pressure, and not of equilibration. It is meant
simply as a more compelling and empirically relevant story of changes in prices given
excess demands than the mechanistic adjustment in the original Walrasian model.
Still, it could be embedded in the standard Walrasian model, replacing the Walrasian
auctioneer, thus creating a model of equilibration. Its stability properties may be
very different from those of the standard Walrasian model, however. This is because
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the link between excess demands and price changes is provided by the Hessian of
the utility function. The latter conveys crucial information about derivatives of
the excess demand function. As a consequence, price adjustment in our model
reflects the very information that [11] proves to be needed for generic stability of
equilibration mechanisms. In other words, replacing the standard, mechanistic price
adjustment rule with our model of price pressure in the Walrasian equilibration model
may generate the very stability that is needed to persuasively claim that general
equilibrium is the natural state to which competitive markets tend. We leave this
conjecture for future work.
In our model, we take aspiration points (desired portfolio holdings) to be globally
optimal positions given past transaction prices. Alternatives can be imagined, such
as aspiration points based on locally optimal movements. See, e.g., [4, 6, 9, 14]. In
these papers, orders are proportional to locally optimal excess demands. But, as in
the Walrasian model, price changes are mechanical: prices change in the direction of
the net order flow. If we were to embed our model of price pressure into a model with
aspiration points based on locally optimal movements, we would generate a completer
model of price adjustment. Preliminary investigation of the implications of such an
approach demonstrates, however, that the empirical implications of a model based on
locally optimal aspiration points makes qualitatively similar predictions as one based
on globally optimal aspiration points. This is because locally optimal movements are
proportional to globally optimal movements, at least in the context of mean-variance
preferences. More general preferences need to be contemplated in order to generate
discriminatory power. We are working on such extensions at present.
Finally, we ought to mention yet another approach to establishing that price
changes and excess demands are linked through the Hessian, namely, the global
Newton procedure suggested in [13]. Our main objection to this model is, however,
that it is devoid of economic meaning, being suggested by numerical analysis rather
than conjectured economic forces.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Parameters in the Experimental Design
Experiment Subject Signup Endowments Cash Loan Exchange
Category Reward A B C Notes Repayment Rate
(Number) (franc) (franc) (franc) $/franc
26 Oct 99 13 0 4 0 5 0 400 2075 0.04
16 0 0 6 5 0 400 2350 0.04
30 Oct 00 46 0 4 0 5 0 400 2075 0.04
22 0 0 6 5 0 400 2350 0.04
6 Nov 00 47 0 4 0 5 0 400 2075 0.04
23 0 0 6 5 0 400 2350 0.04
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Table 3.2: Payoff Matrix
State W X Y Z
Security A 30 190 500 200
Security B 100 270 300 130
Security C 200 210 90 180
Note 100 100 100 100
Table 3.3: OLS Projections of Transactions Price Changes onto Excess Demands
Experiment Security Coefficientsa R2 F -statisticb
Intercept Excess Demandc
A B C
991026 A 3.767 1.918 0.838 -0.473 0.024 5.89
(1.814)∗ (0.898)∗ (0.408)∗ (0.220)∗
B 1.784 0.639 0.425 -0.123 0.031 7.64
(0.997) (0.480) (0.232) (0.115)
C -2.039 -0.914 -0.467 0.214 0.019 4.51
(0.878)∗ (0.406)∗ (0.204)∗ (0.096)∗
001030 A 2.556 2.933 1.085 -0.775 0.062 21.63
(0.788)∗ (0.921)∗ (0.357)∗ (0.240)∗
B 0.466 0.026 0.115 0.020 0.020 6.70
(0.249) (0.239) (0.091) (0.065)
C -0.336 -0.223 -0.032 0.076 0.008 2.75
(0.763) (0.746) (0.300) (0.192)
001106 A 0.687 0.492 0.205 -0.122 0.012 6.22
(0.416) (0.198)∗ (0.091)∗ (0.049)∗
B 0.692 0.174 0.168 -0.018 0.019 10.11
(0.37) (0.143) (0.083)∗ (0.032)
C -1.031 -0.376 -0.152 0.100 0.009 4.84
(0.282)∗ (0.110)∗ (0.051)∗ (0.028)∗
aOLS projections of intra-period transaction price changes onto (i) an intercept, (ii) the estimated
excess demands for the three risky securities (A, B, and C). Standard (White) errors in parentheses.
bp-level in parentheses.
cEstimated on the basis of subjects’ final holdings and last transaction prices.
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Table 3.4: Wald’s Test of Proportionality between Matrix of Slope Coefficients and
Covariance Matrix
























































Figure 3.1: Plots of transaction price changes of A (left panel), B (middle panel) and C (right
panel) as a function of excess demand.
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Figure 3.2: Mechanics of price pressure. Consider a situation where there are three securities, two
risky (called A and B) and one risk-free (called Notes). In A-B space, an agent has endowment point
E. S/he wishes to trade up to an aspiration point, say A0. (The reader cannot verify that the budget
constraint is satisfied, because the Notes dimension is not displayed.) We take the aspiration point
to be the optimal position at relative prices given by the slope of the line tangent to the indifference
curve. As the agent experiences delay in execution of the orders s/he submitted to implement the
move from E to A0, s/he scales back her aspiration point, to A1. At the revised aspiration point, her
marginal valuation for B has increased relative to that of A. This will translate into an increase in the
relative price of B s/he is submitting along with her orders, and hence, potential transaction prices.
The new marginal valuations are given by the slope of the tangent to the indifference curve at A1.
If execution is delayed further, the agent scales back her aspiration level even more, to A2. Marginal
valuations, and hence, order (and potential transaction) prices change correspondingly. The Hessian
of the utility function prescribes how marginal valuations change locally. In the case of mean-variance
preferences, the Hessian is proportional to the covariance of the final payoffs. Because revisions of
marginal valuations induce changes in order prices, and hence, prices at which transactions will take
place, changes in the latter are therefore ultimately determined by the structure of the covariance
matrix. This is born out in the experimental data.
